Campbell v. United States
134 Fed. Cl. 764
| Fed. Cl. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs are personal-injury claimants against Old GM whose asserted "rights to assert successor liability claims against New GM" were extinguished by the bankruptcy court’s July 5, 2009 Sale Order approving a § 363 sale that transferred Old GM assets to New GM free and clear.
- Plaintiffs allege the United States coerced Old GM and the bankruptcy court to include an injunction in the Sale Order extinguishing successor-liability claims, and that this coercion constituted a Fifth Amendment taking.
- The Sale Order and accompanying Sale Opinion were entered July 5, 2009; the 363 sale closed July 10, 2009. Plaintiffs filed this suit on July 9, 2015.
- The government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (RCFC 12(b)(1)) and failure to state a claim (RCFC 12(b)(6)). The court held extensive briefing and argument before ruling.
- The court concluded plaintiffs’ takings claims accrued no later than July 5, 2009 and are barred by the six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2501; in the alternative, the alleged property interest was not a cognizable Fifth Amendment property interest.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When did plaintiffs' takings claims accrue for § 2501 purposes? | Accrual occurred at closing (July 10, 2009). | Accrual occurred when the government’s coercive act produced the Sale Order (no later than July 5, 2009). | Accrued on or before July 5, 2009; claims time-barred under § 2501. |
| What government action constitutes the alleged taking? | The government’s conditioning of the § 363 sale on inclusion of language extinguishing successor-liability claims in the Sale Order. | Same identification; government denies liability and argues the action predated filing window. | Court accepts plaintiffs’ identification of the alleged coercive act but finds it occurred by July 5, 2009. |
| Is the asserted right to bring successor-liability claims a cognizable Fifth Amendment property interest? | Yes: plaintiffs characterize the right (or their underlying right to compensation) as protected property. | No: the right was contingent and limited by preexisting federal bankruptcy law (§ 363), and therefore not a compensable property interest. | Not cognizable: highly contingent and subject to federal bankruptcy law; dismissal for failure to state a takings claim. |
| Could this be characterized as a judicial taking actionable here? | Plaintiffs did not press a judicial-taking theory; ambiguous at argument. | Judicial takings claims based on bankruptcy rulings are beyond the court’s jurisdiction per precedent. | No judicial-taking claim found; such claims are foreclosed in this forum. |
Key Cases Cited
- John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (limitations on equitable tolling for § 2501 and six-year accrual rule)
- Young v. United States, 529 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir.) (claim accrual — plaintiff’s knowledge governs accrual)
- A & D Auto Sales, Inc. v. United States, 748 F.3d 1142 (Fed. Cir.) (coercion-of-third-parties takings framework in Old GM bankruptcy context)
- Branch v. United States, 69 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir.) (identify specific government step that constituted taking)
- Acceptance Ins. Cos. v. United States, 583 F.3d 849 (Fed. Cir.) (disallowing aggregation of sequential government acts; contingent governmental approvals preclude cognizable property right)
- Adams v. United States, 391 F.3d 1212 (Fed. Cir.) (evaluate whether a claimed cause of action protects a legally recognized property interest)
- Bair v. United States, 515 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.) (federal law can inhere in and limit state-law property interests)
- Allustiarte v. United States, 256 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir.) (judicial-takings claims in bankruptcy contexts not within Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction)