Campbell v. State
125 So. 3d 733
| Fla. | 2013Background
- In 1999 Campbell pleaded nolo contendere to multiple sexual offenses and was sentenced in 2000 to 45 years’ imprisonment.
- In 2011 Campbell moved to withdraw his plea under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(g), arguing the trial court never “formally accepted” the plea on the record and thus he could withdraw even post-sentencing.
- The postconviction court denied relief, holding Rule 3.172(g) applies only pre-sentencing and that post-sentence withdrawal requires a showing of manifest injustice or prejudice.
- The Second District affirmed, certified conflict with the First District’s decision in Cox (which allowed post-sentence withdrawal where the court failed to state acceptance), and this Court granted review.
- The Florida Supreme Court held that actual sentencing constitutes “formal acceptance” under Rule 3.172(g) and that post-sentencing withdrawals are governed by Rule 3.170(i), requiring a showing of manifest injustice or clear prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Campbell) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a defendant may withdraw a plea after sentencing solely because the trial court never verbally "formally accepted" the plea under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(g) | Rule 3.172(g) has no temporal limit and applies until the court "formally accepts" the plea, so Campbell can withdraw even after sentencing if the court never said the magic words | Rule 3.172(g) governs pre-sentencing plea withdrawals; after sentencing Rule 3.170(i) controls and requires showing manifest injustice or prejudice | Held for State: sentencing constitutes formal acceptance; post-sentence withdrawal requires manifest injustice or prejudice under Rule 3.170(i) |
| Whether "formal acceptance" requires an explicit on-the-record oral statement that "the court accepts the plea" or may be evidenced by sentencing or other affirmative acts | "Formal acceptance" must be an explicit oral statement; absence of that statement means no acceptance | Formal acceptance can be an affirmative act such as actual sentencing or a written judgment reflecting acceptance | Held for State: sentencing is a sufficient affirmative act to constitute formal acceptance; the rule does not require only a rote oral phrase |
Key Cases Cited
- Harrell v. State, 894 So.2d 935 (Fla. 2005) (explains interplay of rules 3.172 and 3.170 and limits pre- vs. post-sentencing withdrawal)
- Cox v. State, 35 So.3d 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (held defendant could withdraw plea post-sentencing where court failed to state it accepted plea)
- Williams v. State, 316 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1975) (adopted manifest injustice/prejudice standard for vacating pleas after sentencing)
- Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971) (rules violations require prejudice to justify reversal)
- Bass v. State, 541 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (pre-sentence withdrawal required if no formal acceptance; emphasized rule text)
- Harden v. State, 453 So.2d 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (interpreted formal acceptance as an affirmative on-the-record statement)
- Gumm v. State, 655 N.E.2d 610 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holds written judgment or sentencing entry can constitute formal acceptance and defeat a later withdrawal claim)