Camillo v. Campbell Clinic P.C., 2:19-cv-02876

Background

Dr. Francis Camillo, a surgeon at Campbell Clinic, was diagnosed with cancer in 2017 and received workplace accommodations to continue working during treatment, which produced mood-related side effects.
On March 30, 2018 Camillo ordered resident Dr. Catherine Olinger to place a patient in a halo; Olinger disagreed and a dispute followed.
On April 30, 2018 Olinger emailed a Campbell Clinic physician accusing Camillo of using a sexist slur; Camillo alleges the accusation was knowingly false and part of a conspiracy to create a pretext to fire him.
Campbell Clinic discussed Camillo’s temper control; Camillo requested anger-management as an ADA accommodation; Campbell Clinic terminated his employment in June 2018.
Camillo filed state-court claims (later voluntarily dismissed) and this federal suit alleging ADA claims against Campbell Clinic and various state-law tort claims against both defendants; defendants moved to dismiss.
The court denied as moot the pre-amendment motions, denied Campbell Clinic’s motion to dismiss the ADA denial-of-accommodation claim, dismissed Campbell Clinic’s state-law claims, and granted Olinger’s motion to dismiss (with several state-law claims against Olinger dismissed on immunity or statute-of-limitations grounds).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are pre-amendment motions to dismiss moot?	Amended complaint supersedes prior complaints.	Motions filed earlier should be decided.	Moot — initial motions denied as moot.
Did Campbell Clinic fail to consider a reasonable accommodation (anger management) under the ADA?	Accommodation request was timely and the interactive process was ongoing; employer had continuing duty to engage.	Request was untimely and treatments had ended; interactive process was complete.	Denied dismissal — denial-of-accommodation claim survives.
Does the Eleventh Amendment or lack of jurisdiction bar state-law claims against Olinger?	Suit is against Olinger individually for money damages, not the State.	Olinger asserts sovereign immunity for official-capacity claims.	Court has supplemental jurisdiction; Eleventh Amendment does not bar individual-capacity monetary claims.
Are Olinger’s state-law claims barred by immunity or statutes of limitations and adequately pleaded?	Allegations assert malicious, intentional fabrication outside scope of employment (no immunity); savings statute preserves claims.	Olinger asserts absolute immunity under Claims Commission Act and other statutory immunities; also that many claims are time-barred or insufficiently pleaded.	Olinger not immune under HCQIA or TN patient-safety statute; negligent IIED dismissed due to immunity; many tort claims (defamation, IIED, tortious interference with business relations, civil conspiracy) dismissed as time-barred; tortious interference with contract dismissed for failing to allege breach; Olinger’s motion granted overall.

Key Cases Cited

Fisher v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 951 F.3d 409 (6th Cir. 2020) (employer’s duty to continue interactive accommodation process)
Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2001) (interactive-process obligation continues when initial accommodation fails)
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (U.S. 1984) (distinguishing official- vs. individual-capacity suits under Eleventh Amendment)
Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508 (1st Cir. 2009) (permitting state-law damages against state officials personally without Eleventh Amendment bar)
Meyers v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 341 F.3d 461 (6th Cir. 2003) (HCQIA immunity requires reasonable fact-finding; courts review the totality of the process)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading must state a plausible claim)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (legal conclusions not accepted as true on a motion to dismiss)