Camillo Martinez O/B/O Yolanda Martinez v. Nabeel "Bill" Arafat D/B/A Texas Car Stereo, 01-15-00161-CV

Background

Appellant (Camillo Martinez on behalf of Yolanda Martinez) challenges a trial court order granting traditional and no-evidence summary judgment in favor of appellee Nabell “Bill” Arafat (doing business as Texas Car Stereo).
Underlying incident: Miguel Zapeta‑Rodriguez (employee/defendant) drove Yolanda Grifaldo’s vehicle after it had been left at appellee’s shop for repair; while driving the vehicle an accident occurred.
Evidence presented: testimony that the car was brought to the shop July 8, 2011, an employee (Rodriguez) drove it home that evening, and an independent roommate witness (Alejandro Gomez) contradicted appellee’s employees and Rodriguez on timing/possession.
Plaintiff alleges appellee retained control/entrusted the vehicle to Rodriguez, Rodriguez was acting within the course and scope of employment (or at least partly to benefit appellee), and appellee was grossly negligent by permitting an unlicensed epileptic to drive.
Appellant argues these facts create genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment; appellant seeks reversal and remand.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Right to control / Entrustment of vehicle	Vehicle was at appellee’s facility for repair July 8; appellee’s employee (Rodriguez) drove it from shop — creates fact issue that appellee controlled/entrusted vehicle	Appellee contends vehicle was not in its possession/control the day before accident; employees deny entrustment	Trial court granted summary judgment for appellee; appellant argues summary judgment was erroneous because credible testimonial conflicts (e.g., roommate) create fact issues
Course and scope of employment	Rodriguez performed general duties “whatever was needed”; driving to return car/obtain repair served appellee’s business and thus falls within scope	Appellee likely contends driving was personal or unauthorized deviation outside scope	Appellee obtained summary judgment below; appellant contends evidence (purpose to benefit employer, general authority) raises fact question on scope
Deviation / personal errand defense	Even if mixed with personal motives, driving to bring car for repair benefitted appellee; partial deviation doesn't defeat vicarious liability	Appellee would argue Rodriguez deviated for personal reasons (favor/junkyard) so not within scope	Appellant argues precedent allows mixed-purpose acts to remain within scope; claims triable issue exists despite trial court ruling
Gross negligence (entrustment of unlicensed epileptic driver)	Appellee knew Rodriguez was unlicensed and epileptic but permitted him to drive — creates extreme risk and conscious indifference to safety	Appellee would argue no evidence it knew of the specific risk or that entrustment occurred	Trial court granted summary judgment; appellant asserts circumstantial evidence supports gross negligence and thus a jury question exists

Key Cases Cited

Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997) (standards for evaluating summary‑judgment proof)
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence on summary judgment)
Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1985) (burden on movant in traditional summary judgment)
GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999) (course‑and‑scope generally a fact question)
Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1993) (definition and standards for gross negligence)
Wrenn v. G.A.T.X. Logistics, Inc., 73 S.W.3d 489 (Tex. App.―Fort Worth 2002) (employee conduct within scope if of same general nature as authorized)
Hanna v. Lott, 888 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. App.―Tyler 1994) (gross negligence requires extreme risk and awareness)
Gilgon, Inc. v. Hart, 893 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. App.―Corpus Christi 1996) (acts mixing personal and business purposes may remain within scope)