Camesi v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
729 F.3d 239
| 3rd Cir. | 2013Background
- Multiple named plaintiffs filed FLSA suits alleging unpaid meal-break work; courts conditionally certified collectives and hundreds to thousands of employees opted in.
- After discovery, district courts granted defendants’ motions to decertify and denied plaintiffs’ motions for final certification on December 20, 2011.
- Plaintiffs (two consolidated groups) then moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a) to voluntarily dismiss their individual claims with prejudice to obtain a final judgment for purposes of appeal; district courts granted those dismissals and dismissed opt-in claims without prejudice.
- Plaintiffs appealed only the decertification (interlocutory) orders; they did not challenge the final dismissals on the merits.
- Defendants moved to dismiss the appeals for lack of appellate jurisdiction and argued mootness; the Third Circuit consolidated the appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether voluntary Rule 41(a) dismissal that produces a final judgment permits appeal of an earlier interlocutory decertification order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 | Plaintiffs contend the Rule 41(a) dismissal created a final, appealable judgment, allowing review of the decertification order (analogous to Fassett/Trevino‑Barton) | Defendants argue this is an impermissible attempt to manufacture finality to obtain interlocutory review (relying on Sullivan and anti‑piecemeal doctrine) | Court held Rule 41(a) dismissals cannot be used to convert interlocutory decertification orders into appealable final orders; appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction |
| Whether Sullivan (dismissal to obtain review of class ruling) controls rather than Fassett/Trevino‑Barton (permitting dismissal to obtain review where remaining claims are effectively terminated) | Plaintiffs urge Fassett/Trevino‑Barton apply and permit their tactic | Defendants rely on Sullivan to bar appeals that are product of plaintiffs’ own dismissal strategy | Court held Sullivan controls because decertification was interlocutory and plaintiffs’ tactic would undermine §1291 and encourage piecemeal appeals |
| Whether plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal with prejudice renders their individual claims moot but leaves a representative interest to pursue opt‑in plaintiffs’ claims | Plaintiffs argue they retain a personal stake because appeal could affect opt‑ins and resurrect collective litigation | Defendants contend dismissal with prejudice extinguished plaintiffs’ individual claims and any personal stake, mooting the appeals | Court held dismissals with prejudice extinguished plaintiffs’ individual claims and extinguished any residual representative interest here; left open whether representational interest alone can satisfy Article III in other circumstances |
| Whether alternative doctrines or out‑of‑circuit authorities permit appeal here | Plaintiffs cite cases allowing appeals after voluntary dismissals in different factual postures | Defendants cite cases rejecting manufactured finality and mootness doctrines | Court rejected plaintiffs’ authorities as distinguishable and ruled consistent with Sullivan and anti‑piecemeal precedent |
Key Cases Cited
- Sullivan v. Pacific Indem. Co., 566 F.2d 444 (3d Cir. 1977) (plaintiffs may not engineer a dismissal to obtain review of an interlocutory class‑certification decision)
- Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. 1986) (permitting appeal after voluntary dismissal where remaining claims were effectively terminated by prior adverse rulings)
- Trevino‑Barton v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Bank, 919 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1990) (similar principle to Fassett permitting appeal in limited post‑summary‑judgment contexts)
- Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 656 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing two‑step FLSA collective certification analysis)
- In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 493 F.3d 393 (3d Cir. 2007) (finality of dismissal with prejudice generally creates appealable order)
- In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696 (3d Cir. 1996) (merger rule: interlocutory orders merge into final judgment and may be reviewed on appeal from final order)