Cameron v. Wells Fargo Bank NA
2:13-cv-01921
| D. Ariz. | Jul 14, 2014Background
- Craig and Jennifer Cameron obtained a $228,000 mortgage in 2005 and sought loan modifications/refinances repeatedly from 2008–2013, including during bankruptcy; they made modified payments 2008–2012.
- The Deed of Trust named MERS as beneficiary; MERS assigned its interest to Wells Fargo, which appointed trustees and scheduled (but did not hold) trustee sales in 2010 and 2013.
- The Camerons sued in Arizona Superior Court (removed to federal court) alleging consumer fraud (CFA), negligent/intentional torts, contract claims, statutory deed-of-trust violations, estoppel, and related theories against Wells Fargo (and U.S. Bank named but not actively pursued).
- Wells Fargo moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b); the Court considered the pleadings and certain documents (Consent Judgment and exhibits) attached to the original complaint.
- The Court found some misrepresentation allegations pleaded with sufficient particularity (related to promises about loan modifications, payment application, and refinance cancellation) but dismissed or limited several claims for failure to plead required elements or specificity, or because relief was unavailable as pleaded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Arizona Consumer Fraud Act (Counts 1–2) | Camerons allege Wells Fargo made false promises/misrepresentations about modifications, HAMP, payment application, and Consent Judgment compliance causing reliance and damages. | Wells Fargo argues time-bar, insufficiently pleaded claims under Rule 8(a) and Rule 9(b), and lack of specific false statements for some allegations. | Denied dismissal in part: many misrepresentation allegations survive (pleaded with particularity); other allegations (e.g., 2013 refinance denial, certain Consent Judgment-based claims, and some scattered paragraphs) are dismissed or limited. |
| Breach of Contract (Count 3) | Camerons invoke origination/modification documents and alleged promises as contractual obligations. | Wells Fargo contends no specific agreement is alleged and oral promises are barred by statute of frauds. | Grant: dismissed for failure to plead specific contractual terms or breach. |
| Arizona Deeds-of-Trust Statutes (Title 33, Ch. 6.1, Count 4) | Camerons assert statutory violations (unspecified sections) concerning trustee procedures and recordings. | Wells Fargo argues the complaint fails to identify which statutory provisions were violated or plead elements. | Grant: dismissed for failure to specify statute(s) and plead elements. |
| Fraudulent Concealment (Count 6) | Camerons contend Wells Fargo concealed material facts and breached duties tied to HAMP/Consent Decree. | Wells Fargo argues no intentional concealment alleged and no duty established. | Grant: dismissed for failure to allege intentional concealment or material omission. |
| Negligent Misrepresentation (Count 5) | Misstatements were supplied in the course of Wells Fargo’s business for Camerons’ guidance; they relied and were injured. | Wells Fargo attacks Rule 8/9 pleading, reliance, and timeliness as in CFA counts. | Denied dismissal in part: claim survives to the same extent as limited CFA claims. |
| Promissory / Equitable Estoppel (Counts 9–10) | Camerons allege reliance on promises (HAMP compliance, timing, options) causing injury; seek relief and possibly to prevent foreclosure. | Wells Fargo contends claims duplicate other remedies and lack elements. | Denied: promissory estoppel pleaded adequately; equitable estoppel survives only as duplicative/defensive of promissory estoppel. |
| Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing (Count 11) | Camerons assert Wells Fargo’s conduct impaired their contractual benefits (misleading modification process). | Wells Fargo argues no contract term guaranteeing truthful modification communications; no impairment pled. | Grant: dismissed for failure to identify a contract benefit impaired by defendant’s conduct. |
| Consent Judgment Enforcement (Count 8) | Camerons rely on the national Consent Judgment and related exhibits to claim violations. | Wells Fargo notes the Consent Judgment limits enforcement to listed parties and a specific forum (D.C. Court). | Grant: dismissed because plaintiffs are not parties and cannot enforce the Consent Judgment in this Court. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard for Rule 12(b)(6))
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must contain factual content permitting reasonable inference of liability)
- Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 728 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2013) (requirements for HAMP-related modification claims)
- Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 2001) (Rule 12(b)(6) tests legal sufficiency)
- Gust, Rosenfeld & Henderson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 182 Ariz. 586 (Ariz. 1995) (Arizona discovery rule for accrual of claims)
- United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2003) (consideration of documents incorporated by reference on a motion to dismiss)