Cameron Reed v. United States
734 F.3d 881
9th Cir.2013Background
- Cameron Reed was stopped in Lake Mead National Recreation Area after erratic driving; officer smelled marijuana, found alcohol and marijuana, and Reed failed field sobriety tests. Blood tests showed 3.7 ng/ml THC.
- Reed was charged in federal court by assimilation under the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA) with violating Nevada’s per se drugged driving law (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484C.110(3)(g)) and also charged under various 36 C.F.R. traffic/NPS regulations; he entered a conditional guilty plea reserving the right to appeal assimilation of the Nevada per se provision.
- The government used the ACA to incorporate Nevada’s per se marijuana blood-level offense into federal law because no federal per se drugged-driving regulation exists.
- The district court held the ACA properly assimilated Nevada’s per se drugged-driving statute despite 36 C.F.R. § 4.23(a)(1), the NPS ‘‘under the influence’’ DUI regulation, which punishes impairment from drugs or alcohol.
- On appeal the Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the federal regulation precluded assimilation under the Supreme Court’s two-step Lewis test and affirmed the district court: assimilation was proper because a gap exists in federal law and the NPS intended to adopt nonconflicting state traffic laws.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Reed) | Defendant's Argument (Government/NPS) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Nevada’s per se drugged-driving statute can be assimilated under the ACA when a federal regulation penalizes driving under the influence of drugs | The federal DUI regulation already punishes Reed’s conduct; absence of a federal per se drug rule reflects an intent to exclude per se drug laws from federal enforcement, so ACA assimilation is barred | Part 4 of Title 36 expressly adopts nonconflicting state traffic laws to fill gaps; federal DUI regulation punishes impairment but not per se drug levels, so it does not occupy the field | Assimilation is proper: §4.23(a)(1) punishes impairment but does not preclude application of a state per se drug law; NPS intended to incorporate nonconflicting state traffic laws and a gap exists in federal regulation |
Key Cases Cited
- Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155 (Sup. Ct. 1998) (establishes two-step test for ACA assimilation)
- United States v. Waites, 198 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 1999) (federal regulations qualify as "enactments of Congress" under ACA)
- United States v. Souza, 392 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2004) (assimilate state statute when federal law leaves a gap for the specific conduct)
- United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977) (ACA fills gaps to establish uniformity on federal enclaves)
- United States v. Bibbins, 637 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2011) (state traffic law incorporated directly under 36 C.F.R. §4.2)
- United States v. Bohn, 622 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (state helmet law applied under §4.2)
- United States v. Adams, 502 F. Supp. 21 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (refusing assimilation where federal regulation covered the precise act)
- Press Publ’g Co. v. United States, 219 U.S. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1911) (historical context for ACA)
- Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (ACA permits local statutes to fill gaps in federal criminal law)