Camenisch v. Umpqua Bank
763 F.Supp.3d 871
N.D. Cal.2025Background
- Plaintiffs allege that Umpqua Bank aided and abetted PFI's fraudulent schemes and breaches of fiduciary duty, seeking damages as a class action.
- Multiple expert witnesses have been disclosed by both sides; Umpqua moved to exclude expert opinion and testimony from plaintiffs’ experts and to limit what certain fact witnesses may testify to.
- Central to the evidentiary disputes are: whether plaintiffs' experts rely on inadmissible hearsay, whether certain expert opinions go to improper ultimate legal issues, and foundation for business record exceptions.
- Plaintiffs and Umpqua both filed various motions in limine to exclude categories of argument or evidence at trial.
- The order resolves these evidentiary disputes ahead of trial, also requiring parties to coordinate on sealing motions for certain documents.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exclusion of Ghiglieri’s expert testimony | Ghiglieri’s banking industry opinions are relevant and properly disclosed | Her opinions contain impermissible legal conclusions and state-of-mind assessments, and/or were undisclosed | Granted in part (industry norms admissible, legal/state of mind opinions barred, one undisclosed opinion excluded) |
| Admissibility of Salah’s damages opinions and database reliance | Database qualifies as a business record; opinions reliable and methodologically sound | Database is hearsay, prepared for litigation, unreliable, and methodologies flawed | Denied (may be admissible with proper foundation; methodologies permissible) |
| Goldberg’s opinions on Ponzi scheme status | Goldberg can opine as percipient and expert witness; characterizing PFI as Ponzi factual | Testimony draws legal conclusions, improper under Rule 702 | Denied; Goldberg may testify on scope, factual underpinnings, not legal conclusions |
| Use of bankruptcy stipulations, SEC complaints, and SAR-privileged evidence | Some evidence legally significant for context (e.g., stipulations), expert/fact witness scope agreed | All such evidence is hearsay, irrelevant, or unduly prejudicial | Denied in part/granted in part (some complaints excluded as hearsay, stipulations allowed for non-truth purposes, SAR-privileged docs not referenced) |
Key Cases Cited
- Barabin v. AstenJohnson, Inc., 740 F.3d 457 (9th Cir. 2014) (expert testimony must be both relevant and reliable under Rule 702)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (district court serves as gatekeeper for reliability of expert testimony)
- Hangarter v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2004) (experts may not opine on ultimate legal conclusions)
- Casey v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn., 127 Cal. App. 4th 1138 (2005) (bank liability for aiding and abetting requires actual knowledge exception)
- Nationwide Transp. Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys., Inc., 523 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (instructing jury on law is the court’s role, not experts')