Camden National Bank v. Ilene F. Weintraub
143 A.3d 788
| Me. | 2016Background
- Weintraub and her brother fell behind on two mortgage loans with Camden National Bank; Bank collections contacts led to an alleged abusive interaction and a reported threat to a collections specialist.
- A Bank employee reported Weintraub’s alleged threat to police; police informed Weintraub she was being investigated and told her to bank in person rather than call collections.
- Bank filed foreclosure in July 2013; Weintraub later filed counterclaims (including violation of the Maine Consumer Credit Code, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress), alleging physical effects (blood sugar spike, nausea, cough), missed work, and increased diabetes medication.
- Bank moved for selective dismissal under Maine’s anti‑SLAPP statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556, seeking dismissal of three of four counterclaim counts (not breach of contract), arguing its reports to police were protected petitioning activity.
- The Superior Court denied the special motion, concluding (a) the statute did not permit selective dismissal of only some claims (error later deemed harmless), and (b) Weintraub made a prima facie showing of actual injury and causation without requiring expert medical proof at that stage.
- The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed: it held selective dismissal is permitted under § 556, but upheld denial on the merits because Weintraub established prima facie actual injury and causation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Weintraub) | Defendant's Argument (Camden Natl.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 556 permits selective dismissal of some claims in a multi‑count pleading | § 556 should not be used to dismiss only those claims based on petitioning; statute should not permit claim‑by‑claim dismissal | § 556 applies to any claims based on petitioning activity and does not require dismissal of all claims in the action | Court: selective dismissal is allowed; statute’s text permits dismissal of discrete claims (trial court’s contrary ruling was harmless) |
| Whether Weintraub made a prima facie showing of "actual injury" under § 556 | Affidavit alleged physical harms (blood sugar spike, nausea, violent cough), missed work, and increased medication—allowing reasonably certain damages | Affidavit lacks concrete monetary valuation and is insufficient to show non‑speculative damages | Court: allegations of physical injury, lost work, and increased medication satisfy prima facie actual injury; damages calculable with reasonable certainty |
| Whether Weintraub made a prima facie showing of causation between Bank’s petitioning and her injuries | Temporal and factual linkage in affidavit (stress from accusation led to medical effects and missed work) suffices at prima facie stage | Medical causation (blood chemistry changes) is complex and requires expert proof; affidavit is conclusory/speculative | Court: prima facie causation met; no expert testimony required at this early stage; temporal/factual allegations suffice for production burden |
| Whether expert medical testimony is required to meet prima facie burden on causation and injury | Not required at the prima facie stage; affidavits and pleadings may establish some evidence on elements | Expert proof is necessary for complex medical causation and to avoid speculation | Court: expert testimony not required to meet prima facie burden; complex expert issues may be addressed later in proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 41 A.3d 551 (Me. 2012) (interpreting § 556 standards for prima facie burden and evidence)
- Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 66 A.3d 571 (Me. 2013) (procedural guidance on special motions to dismiss under § 556)
- Schelling v. Lindell, 942 A.2d 1226 (Me. 2008) (defining "actual injury" and damages certainty under § 556)
- Town of Madawaska v. Cayer, 103 A.3d 547 (Me. 2014) (standard of review for special motions to dismiss)
- Maravell v. R.J. Grondin & Sons, 914 A.2d 709 (Me. 2007) (addressing when expert testimony is needed for medical causation)
- Merriam v. Wanger, 757 A.2d 778 (Me. 2000) (limitations on inferring complex medical causation without expert evidence)
- Lynch v. Christie, 815 F. Supp. 2d 341 (D. Me. 2011) (recognizing reports to law enforcement as protected petitioning activity)