Calloway v. State
810 S.E.2d 105
Ga.2018Background
- Calloway and co-defendant husband Hicks manufactured meth in their apartment; a flash fire during the process severely burned their infant son Chelton, who later died.
- Federal indictment (Jan 2002) charged Calloway with conspiracy and attempt to manufacture meth and creating a substantial risk of harm; she was convicted in Dec 2002.
- State charges arising from the same February 17, 2001 events included two felony-murder counts (one predicated on manufacturing, one on attempt), manufacturing meth, possession with intent to distribute, and possession.
- At state trial (2004) jury convicted Calloway of felony murder (predicated on manufacturing), manufacturing, possession with intent to distribute, and possession; she was acquitted on the felony-murder count predicated on attempt.
- The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed sufficiency, whether OCGA § 16-1-8(c) barred successive state prosecution after federal conviction, and a claim that the prosecutor improperly “read the law” on causation to the jury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for manufacturing/possession convictions | Calloway: Hicks alone manufactured; her conduct (buying pseudoephedrine at other times) insufficient to convict | State: purchases, widespread meth-making supplies in home, sales and purchases support participation and intent to distribute | Evidence sufficient to support manufacturing, possession with intent to distribute, and possession convictions |
| Whether OCGA § 16-1-8(c) bars state felony-murder prosecution after federal conviction for attempt to manufacture meth | Calloway: federal conviction for attempt constituted prior prosecution for same conduct, barring state felony-murder prosecution | State: relied on Marshall to argue prosecution permitted because felony murder requires proof of death and federal offense differed | Felony-murder conviction (predicated on manufacturing) reversed: § 16-1-8(c) bars the state prosecution because federal attempt conviction required no additional fact beyond the predicate felony; federal and state prosecutions arose from same conduct |
| Whether possession-with-intent convictions are barred by § 16-1-8(c) | Calloway: all state counts arise from same conduct and are barred by prior federal convictions | State: possession offense requires proof (possession + intent to distribute) different from federal conspiracy/attempt elements | Possession-with-intent (and possession) not barred; remand for resentencing on possession-with-intent count |
| Prosecutor "reading the law" on proximate causation during closing | Calloway: trial court erred in allowing prosecutor to instruct jury on causation | State: (implicit) error did not require reversal | Moot — felony-murder conviction reversed, so claim is moot |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
- Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (dual sovereignty doctrine)
- Marshall v. State, 286 Ga. 446 (distinguishes cases where federal offense required element not present in state law)
- Sullivan v. State, 279 Ga. 893 (interpreting OCGA § 16-1-8(c) framework)
- Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211 (required-evidence test for separate offenses)
- Carothers v. United States, 121 F.3d 659 (elements of attempt to commit a drug offense)
- Shabani v. United States, 513 U.S. 10 (conspiracy mens rea principles)