Calloway v. State
303 Ga. 48
| Ga. | 2018Background
- In Feb. 2001, a fire caused by methamphetamine manufacture in Calloway’s apartment severely burned infant Chelton, who later died; Hicks (her husband) was the person manufacturing meth that night.
- Calloway routinely purchased pseudoephedrine and other supplies, participated in distribution, and materials/equipment for meth were found throughout the residence.
- Federal indictment (Jan. 2002) charged Calloway with conspiracy and attempt to manufacture meth and creating a substantial risk of harm; she was convicted in federal court (Dec. 2002).
- State indictment charged two counts of felony murder (one predicated on manufacturing, one on attempted manufacture), manufacturing meth, possession with intent to distribute, and simple possession; at trial (2004) Calloway was convicted of felony murder (predicated on manufacturing) and the drug counts.
- Calloway appealed, arguing (1) insufficient evidence, (2) state prosecution barred by OCGA § 16-1-8(c) because of prior federal convictions, and (3) prosecutorial error in “reading the law” to the jury on proximate causation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence of participation in manufacturing/distribution and felony murder | Calloway: She did not participate in manufacture that caused the fire; purchases of pseudoephedrine were at other times | State: Evidence of regular purchases, distribution, presence of materials, and joint drug activity supports party liability | Court: Evidence sufficient to convict on felony murder (predicated on manufacturing), manufacturing, possession with intent to distribute, and simple possession |
| Whether OCGA § 16-1-8(c) barred state felony murder prosecution after federal convictions | Calloway: Federal conviction for attempt/conspiracy bars successive state prosecution for same conduct | State: Dual-sovereignty allows state prosecution; Marshall permits state prosecution when federal offense contains an element not required by the state offense | Court: §16-1-8(c) bars the felony murder conviction because federal attempt to manufacture required no fact not required by state felony murder; felony murder reversed and unmerged convictions adjusted |
| Whether OCGA § 16-1-8(c) bars state possession-with-intent conviction given prior federal convictions | Calloway: Possession-with-intent is same conduct as federal attempt/conspiracy | State: Federal offenses and state possession require different proof (agreement/attempt vs. possession + intent) | Court: §16-1-8(c) does not bar possession-with-intent because each prosecution required proof of a fact the other did not; remand for resentencing on that count |
| Prosecutor’s reading of law on proximate causation to jury | Calloway: Prosecutor improperly “read the law” on causation, requiring reversal | State: Reading was permissible or harmless | Court: Issue is moot because felony murder conviction reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency review)
- Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (dual-sovereignty doctrine permits separate prosecutions by state and federal governments)
- Sullivan v. State, 279 Ga. 893 (interpretation of OCGA § 16-1-8(c) and concurrent jurisdiction analysis)
- Marshall v. State, 286 Ga. 446 (distinguishes when federal conviction contains interstate-commerce element that the state counterpart lacks)
- Perkinson v. State, 273 Ga. 491 (predicate felony is a lesser-included offense of felony murder)
- Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211 (required-evidence test for determining whether prosecutions are for the same offense)
- United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (conspiracy requires proof of agreement)