Callari ex rel. Blackman Plumbing Supply, Inc. v. Blackman Plumbing Supply, Inc.
988 F. Supp. 2d 261
E.D.N.Y2013Background
- Plaintiff Michael Callari sued BPS and related defendants under the FLSA and NY labor law seeking unpaid overtime; George Ruggiero later opted in as the sole opt-in plaintiff.
- Callari worked at BPS from 1981 to July 15, 2010, ultimately as Assistant Branch Manager at Mineóla; he was salaried ($80,000) and classified exempt; his duties mixed sales and some limited managerial tasks.
- Ruggiero worked as an inside salesperson (and briefly assistant manager earlier) at Mineóla; he was laid off in March 2009 and received two payments related to a DOL settlement, signing a WH-58 receipt at BPS’s office.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing: Callari was exempt (executive/administrative/combination exemptions); Callari’s and Ruggiero’s federal claims are time-barred and Ruggiero waived FLSA claims by signing the WH-58; and the court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
- The court (1) granted summary judgment for defendants as to Ruggiero’s FLSA claim (finding waiver via the WH-58), but allowed his NYLL claim to proceed; (2) denied summary judgment as to Callari — his FLSA claim survives (court found triable issues whether his primary duties were managerial or sales); (3) found Callari’s April 30, 2012 declaration sufficient to constitute written consent for FLSA collective-action tolling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Ruggiero waive his FLSA claim by accepting DOL-supervised payment and signing WH-58? | Ruggiero later asserted coercion/fraud and that he was not informed; he kept payments. | WH-58 explicitly warned that acceptance waives FLSA suit; payment was in full per DOL settlement. | Waiver found: summary judgment granted for defendants on Ruggiero’s FLSA claim; NYLL claim not waived. |
| Is Callari’s FLSA collective claim time-barred (2-yr v. 3-yr statute)? | Callari argued tolling/ willfulness (to reach 3-year period) and relied on a 2012 declaration identifying himself as named plaintiff. | Defendants argued no willfulness evidence so 2-year limit applies and Callari’s written consent filed in 2013 was untimely. | Court applied 2-year rule (no willfulness shown) but accepted Callari’s April 30, 2012 declaration as sufficient written consent, so claim not time-barred. |
| Was Callari exempt under the executive/administrative (or combination) FLSA exemptions? | Callari contended his primary duties were sales; managerial duties were limited and episodic. | Defendants contended his title, some supervisory tasks, and branch responsibilities established exemptions. | Triable issues of fact exist as to primary duty, supervision, discretion, and relative importance of managerial tasks; summary judgment denied. |
| Should plaintiff be precluded from seeking collective/class certification now? | Plaintiff seeks leave to move for certification; argues collective action viable. | Defendants argued waiver from not earlier certifying and lack of similarly situated employees. | Court refused to preclude later certification motion and left certification issues for future motion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard)
- Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (deference to agency regulation interpreting its own rules)
- McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128 (definition of willful violation under FLSA)
- Mullins v. City of New York, 653 F.3d 104 (FLSA executive exemption elements)
- Havey v. Homebound Mortgage, Inc., 547 F.3d 158 (burden on employer to prove exemption narrowly construed)
- Zhengfang Liang v. Cafe Spice SB, Inc., 911 F.Supp.2d 184 (waiver via DOL-supervised payment and WH-58 form)
- Gustafson v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 171 F.Supp.2d 311 (insufficient evidence of willfulness at summary judgment)
- Clougher v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 696 F.Supp.2d 285 (fact-intensive primary-duty inquiry for assistant managers)