Callahan v. City of Chicago
813 F.3d 658
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- Melissa Callahán leased taxis and medallions in Chicago (2009–2011); she provided labor, skill, and a chauffeur’s license but owned no cab or medallion.
- Callahán alleges her net earnings (fares/tips minus leases and gas) averaged below federal and Illinois minimum wages.
- She sued the City of Chicago advancing two theories: a regulatory takings claim (fares caps confiscatory) and an FLSA/Illinois minimum-wage claim that the City is her employer because it permits and regulates taxi operations.
- District Court dismissed the takings claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and later, on summary judgment, rejected the wage claim because Chicago was not Callahán’s employer.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed: no compensable regulatory taking for Callahán (she owns no regulated asset), and the City is not her employer under the FLSA despite extensive regulation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Regulatory takings: Do Chicago fare and lease-rate caps constitute a taking requiring compensation? | City rate caps reduce driver earnings and confiscate value; compensation required. | Callahán owns no regulated property (no medallion/cab); rate caps affect owners, not leased drivers. | No taking as to Callahán — she has no property interest whose value was confiscated. |
| Whether Chicago is an "employer" under the FLSA (29 U.S.C. §203(g)) because it permits and regulates taxi driving | Chicago "suffers or permits" drivers to work by regulating fares and the taxi system, so it must pay minimum wages. | City is a regulator, not an employer; treating every regulator as employer would collapse public/private distinction and exceed FLSA scope. | City is not the employer; regulation/permission to operate does not alone create FLSA employment. |
| Scope/utility of Lauritzen factors: Should the court apply the seven-factor test to label the City an employer? | Lauritzen factors can show employer status here given regulation and public importance of taxis. | Lauritzen addresses contractor/employee relations in private employment contexts; not apt to convert regulators into employers. | Court declines to extend Lauritzen to make government an employer simply because it extensively regulates. |
| Broader consequences of ruling: Would recognizing City as employer make many private actors public employees or state actors? | Implicitly argues taxis are unique (common carriers) and thus limited effect. | Recognizing the claim would make many regulated private workers public employees and state actors, producing untenable constitutional consequences. | Rejection: holding would improperly blur public/private employment and state-action doctrines. |
Key Cases Cited
- Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (takings claims usually directed to state inverse-condemnation procedures)
- Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (regulatory-takings standard where regulation deprives all economically beneficial use)
- Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (takings jurisprudence addressing regulatory burdens on property)
- Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (extensive regulation does not, by itself, make a private actor a state actor)
- Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (commercial regulation does not convert private parties into state actors)
- Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (extensive regulation and public funding are insufficient to make a private entity a state actor)
- Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529 (Seventh Circuit factors for distinguishing employees from independent contractors)
- Sorrentino v. Godinez, 777 F.3d 410 (federal jurisdiction over takings claims when state law provides no compensation for regulatory takings)
