397 S.W.3d 342
Tex. App.2013Background
- Callahan sued Vitesse for premises liability after slipping on ice on the Dallas Love Field ramp.
- Vitesse leased the private terminal at Love Field and operated a facility adjacent to the ramp.
- An ice storm struck Dallas on January 27–28, 2009; the incident occurred as Callahan exited the building onto the ramp.
- Vitesse moved for summary judgment on Callahan’s negligence/premises-liability claims, relying on the natural-accumulation rule for ice.
- Callahan amended pleadings multiple times, adding negligence per se theories under federal and Dallas ordinances/regulations.
- The trial court struck a key affidavit but could consider Callahan’s response evidence; it granted summary judgment on all claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether naturally occurring ice can be an unreasonably dangerous condition | Callahan contends ice could be unreasonably dangerous and not purely natural. | Vitesse asserts natural-accumulation ice cannot support liability under premises liability. | Ice was naturally accumulating; not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. |
| Whether the natural-accumulation rule applies under this case’s facts | Callahan argues exceptions to the rule apply due to conditions on an airport tarmac. | Vitesse argues no exception applies because ice remained a natural accumulation. | No applicable exception; rule controls the outcome. |
| Whether the summary judgment broad enough to reach later-pleaded claims | Callahan asserts the motion did not address claims beyond the initial premises-liability theory. | Vitesse contends its motion negates a common duty element and covers all claims. | Motion was not broad enough to reach the later-pleaded claims; others remanded. |
| Whether negligence per se claims were adequately addressed | Callahan asserts statutory duties create separate negligence per se claims. | Vitesse argues negligence per se is not independent of common-law duty and thus covered by the motion. | Summary judgment not broad enough to dispose of negligence-per-se claims; remanded for proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- Fair v. Imperial Sugar Co., 310 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. 2010) (naturally occurring ice not unreasonably dangerous; special rules for ice)
- M. Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2003) (natural ice accumulation remains non-liability-generating)
- Lampasas v. Spring Center, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. App.—Hou. [14th Dist.] 1999) (distinguishes when amended petitions affect summary judgment scope)