255 So. 3d 99
Miss.2017Background
- On July 11, 2009, an armed man shot and killed Frank and Taylor Clark and wounded Tonya Clark; Taylor’s car was taken from the scene. Caleb Corrothers was later identified by two eyewitnesses (Tonya and Joshua Clark) and arrested; a gas‑station video tied him to the area that morning.
- Corrothers was convicted of two counts of capital murder and one count of aggravated assault and sentenced to death; this Court affirmed on direct appeal in Corrothers v. State, 148 So. 3d 278 (Miss. 2014).
- Corrothers filed a petition for leave to file a post‑conviction relief (PCR) motion raising ten claims: ineffective assistance (multiple grounds), unreliable/recanted identifications, juror bias from improper contact, Eighth Amendment challenges (proportionality and method), and cumulative error.
- The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the PCR leave petition under the statutory standard requiring claims to be procedurally alive and to substantially show the denial of a state or federal right.
- The Court denied leave on nine claims (finding failure to show deficient performance or prejudice, procedural bar, or insufficiency on the face of the petition) but granted leave to proceed to the trial court on one claim: alleged juror bias from improper communication between a juror and victim Tonya Clark.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Corrothers) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ineffective assistance for failure to investigate and present mitigation (family/lay witnesses) | Counsel failed to investigate/call additional mitigation witnesses and prepare them, prejudicing sentencing | Mitigation of similar scope was presented at trial; new affidavits are cumulative and would not likely change outcome | Denied — no deficient performance or reasonable probability of different result |
| Ineffective assistance for failure to pursue additional/expert mental testing (executive functioning, psychiatric) | Additional neuropsych/psychiatric testing would show severe executive deficits and would likely alter sentencing | Counsel obtained a psychologist, presented similar testimony; additional testing would be cumulative | Denied — no prejudice; existing expert covered relevant issues |
| Failure to ensure jury gave full effect to mitigation / jury instructions | Counsel failed to secure sufficient mitigation instructions | Trial counsel tendered instructions; court rejected them but instruction set at trial was adequate and reviewed on direct appeal | Denied — no deficient performance (instructions were adequate) |
| Failure to object to prosecutorial argument (lack of remorse; alleged suggestion of fingerprints) | Counsel should have objected to improper comments that misstated evidence and attacked mitigation | Prosecutorial comments were within permissible scope; State did not claim prints were found but argued reasonable inferences from interview | Denied — arguments not improper; no prejudice |
| Cumulative error of counsel | Combined errors deprived him of a fair trial/sentencing | No individual errors established, so no cumulative effect | Denied — no underlying errors to cumulate |
| Unreliable / recanted eyewitness identification (Hickinbottom) | Hickinbottom later recanted/inconsistent affidavit undermining in‑court ID; requests evidentiary hearing | Claim was not raised at trial (waived); even if recanted, other eyewitness IDs (Tonya & Joshua) support conviction | Denied — procedurally barred/insufficient to show reasonable probability of different result |
| Right to impartial jury — alleged juror contact with victim | Juror allegedly communicated with victim’s family (smile/wink, comments like "We got it") creating bias | State argues claim could have been raised earlier and is barred | Granted limited leave — claim is procedurally alive; evidentiary hearing in trial court required to allow proof of actual juror bias |
| Eighth Amendment – proportionality of death sentence | Death is disproportionate compared with similar cases | Direct appeal already addressed proportionality; precedents uphold similar death sentences | Denied — claim was reviewed on direct appeal and is procedurally barred |
| Eighth Amendment – method of execution (lethal injection protocol) | Protocol poses substantial risk of cruel and unusual punishment; preserved for later litigation | U.S. Supreme Court has upheld execution protocols; petitioner must identify a known, available, less painful alternative | Denied — petition fails to identify feasible, less‑risky alternative; claim insufficient on face of petition |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two‑part ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (right to hearing to prove actual juror bias)
- Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (remedy for extrajudicial juror influence is an evidentiary hearing)
- Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (Eighth Amendment challenges to method of execution require proof and consideration of feasible alternatives)
- Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (method‑of‑execution claim requires identification of a feasible, less‑painful alternative)
- Corrothers v. State, 148 So. 3d 278 (Miss. 2014) (direct appeal affirming convictions and death sentence)