Calderon v. Lang (In Re Calderon), 507 B.R. 724

Debtor Amado Calderon owned a residence he occupied from 2002 until moving out after his 2011 divorce; he became sole owner in March 2011.
Calderon moved into a rented home (the Berkley House) in April/May 2011 and leased the former residence to tenants under a written lease beginning May 1, 2012 (with renewal option).
Calderon filed chapter 7 in July 2012 and amended Schedule C in September 2012 to claim a homestead exemption in the residence under A.R.S. § 33-1101(A).
Trustee Beth Lang objected, arguing Calderon had abandoned the homestead because he was not living there and was renting it when he filed bankruptcy.
At the evidentiary hearing Calderon was sanctioned for failing to comply with pre-hearing orders and was barred from presenting evidence; the court relied solely on the trustee’s evidence and sustained the objection, holding a vague intent to return was insufficient even though Calderon had been absent less than two years.
The BAP vacated and remanded, holding the bankruptcy court misinterpreted Arizona law: absence under two years does not automatically extinguish a homestead — intent controls, with a two-year temporal guideline shifting the presumption.

Issue	Calderon (Plaintiff) Argument	Lang (Defendant/Trustee) Argument	Held
Whether Calderon abandoned his Arizona homestead such that he could not claim the exemption at filing	Calderon had an established homestead and his move was temporary; he intended to return, and absence under two years should not defeat the exemption	Calderon had moved out and was renting the property at filing, so he no longer resided there and thus could not claim a homestead exemption	Vacated and remanded: Arizona law requires proof of intent to permanently abandon; absence under two years creates a presumption against abandonment (i.e., only clear evidence of permanent intent will defeat exemption), while absence two years or more creates a presumption of abandonment unless clear temporary intent shown.

First Nat’l Bank of Mesa v. Reeves, 234 P. 556 (Ariz. 1925) (Arizona homestead statutes are to be liberally construed to protect claimants)
Wuicich v. Solomon–Wickersham Co., 157 P. 972 (Ariz. 1916) (statutory construction of homestead law; look to statute language and comparable authorities)
Jackson v. Phoenixflight Prods., Inc., 700 P.2d 1342 (Ariz. 1985) (statutory interpretation focuses on legislative intent; plain language controls)
In re Jacobson, 676 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2012) (bankruptcy estate/exemption principles; look to state law for exemptions)
In re Kekauoha-Alisa, 674 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2012) (predicting state law; use highest state court authority where available)
In re Cerchione, 414 B.R. 540 (9th Cir. BAP 2009) (de novo review of bankruptcy court’s interpretation of state exemption law)