Calamaco, Danny, PD-0552-15

Defendant Danny Calamaco was indicted for murder with a deadly-weapon allegation and prior-felony enhancements; a jury convicted him and the trial court assessed life imprisonment.
Before voir dire, Calamaco (then represented by appointed counsel Monte Sherrod) moved to waive counsel and represent himself; the trial judge questioned and admonished him about risks of self-representation.
The judge told Calamaco he could change his mind during trial and let his attorney resume representation; the judge also warned that self-representation would be difficult and that Calamaco would ‘‘miss a lot of things.’’
During defense voir dire, Calamaco attempted to withdraw his waiver and asked the court to allow Sherrod to conduct voir dire; the trial judge refused to let counsel take over voir dire and required Calamaco to finish voir dire himself.
The 11th Court of Appeals held the trial court adequately admonished Calamaco and that his waiver was knowing and intelligent, but also found the trial court erred by depriving him of counsel during voir dire and treated that deprivation as a non-structural error subject to a harm analysis.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Calamaco)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held (Court of Appeals)
1. Whether the trial court properly admonished defendant before accepting his Faretta waiver	Court’s admonitions were misleading and incomplete; defendant reasonably relied on judge’s promise he could change his mind and have counsel resume, so waiver was not knowing/intelligent	Admonishments were sufficient under Faretta and Art. 1.051; waiver was knowing/intelligent	Admonishments were sufficient; waiver valid
2. Whether defendant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary	Waiver was not valid because it was based on erroneous assurances and practical limitations that later deprived him of counsel during a critical phase	Waiver was valid given the colloquy and defendant’s understanding	Waiver found knowing and intelligent
3. Whether partial deprivation of counsel during voir dire is structural (per se reversible) or subject to harmless-error review	Partial deprivation (denying counsel during defendant’s voir dire) can be structural error because it affects trial framework and counsel’s choices are unquantifiable	Error was not structural because defendant was not totally deprived of counsel (standby counsel present); apply harm analysis	Error found but deemed non-structural; applied harm analysis

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has Sixth Amendment right to self-representation; waiver must be knowing and intelligent)
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiver of counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent)
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) (limitations on cross-examination can implicate Sixth Amendment rights)
Cronic v. United States, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (circumstances exist where presumption of prejudice is appropriate without showing specific harm)
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (erroneous deprivation of counsel of choice is structural error not subject to harmless-error review)
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (distinguishing structural from trial-error for harmless-error analysis)
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (limits on standby counsel’s role when defendant proceeds pro se)
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (in certain contexts denial of counsel requires presumptive prejudice)
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (some constitutional errors are structural and not subject to harmless-error review)
Williams v. State, 252 S.W.3d 353 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) (Texas standards applying Faretta and Article 1.051 for valid waivers)