Background - CDLA (a nonprofit of DUI defense lawyers) and attorney Mandell sued the California DMV and its director, alleging the APS (administrative per se) hearing system unconstitutionally combines advocacy and adjudication in DMV hearing officers, plus impermissible ex parte managerial review. - APS suspensions remove a driver's license administratively when BAC ≥ .08; drivers may request an administrative hearing within 10 days and DMV bears the burden of proof at that hearing. - CDLA pleaded § 1983 (Fourteenth Amendment due process), a parallel California constitutional due process claim, and an "illegal expenditure/waste" claim under CCP § 526a seeking declaratory/injunctive relief. - The trial court granted DMV summary judgment and denied CDLA's motion, holding CDLA lacked taxpayer standing under CCP § 526a (the court viewed the complaint as a challenge to DMV's implementation rather than to the statute itself). - On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed solely on standing, holding CDLA had taxpayer standing under CCP § 526a and common-law taxpayer standing; the court remanded for further proceedings and did not decide the merits. ### Issues | Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |---|---:|---:|---| | Whether CDLA has taxpayer standing under CCP § 526a to challenge the APS hearing structure as an illegal expenditure/waste | The APS structure that combines advocate and adjudicator and permits ex parte managerial reversal is constitutionally illegal; spending to operate an unconstitutional system is "waste" and thus actionable under § 526a | DMV: the APS structure is authorized by statute (Vehicle Code) and thus not "illegal"; plaintiffs can seek judicial review individually, so a taxpayer suit is unnecessary | Court: CDLA has § 526a standing — alleged due process violations, if proved, would make the system illegal/wasteful; whether conduct is actually illegal is a merits question, not a threshold standing bar | | Whether existence of other, directly affected plaintiffs (drivers) bars a § 526a taxpayer suit | A taxpayer suit is appropriate even where individuals also have remedies; § 526a was intended to permit broad citizen challenges that might otherwise go unlitigated | DMV: ready avenues (individual judicial review) mean taxpayer action not needed; plaintiff actions undermine exclusivity of other remedies | Court: availability of individual remedies does not defeat § 526a standing; precedents allow taxpayer suits despite potential directly affected plaintiffs | | Whether CDLA has common-law taxpayer standing (ultra vires) | If APS procedures are unconstitutional (ultra vires), common-law taxpayer standing exists to enjoin ultra vires acts | DMV: it acted within statutory authority, so no ultra vires conduct | Court: CDLA sufficiently alleged ultra vires/unlawful action for common-law taxpayer standing; therefore standing exists | ### Key Cases Cited Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.3d 258 (Cal. 1971) (taxpayer suit appropriate to challenge constitutionality of county enforcement practices) Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal.3d 424 (Cal. 1980) (existence of directly affected plaintiffs does not bar taxpayer actions under § 526a) Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 40 Cal.4th 1 (Cal. 2006) (procedural fairness requires separation between advocates and adjudicators in some agency settings) Rondon v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 151 Cal.App.4th 1274 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (post-hearing review of prosecutor-prepared reports violated APA prohibitions on ex parte/use of extra-record information) Nightlife Partners v. City of Beverly Hills, 108 Cal.App.4th 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (city official's advocacy role with decisionmaker can violate due process) Cinquegrani v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 163 Cal.App.4th 741 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (driver's license suspension implicates due process protections) * Lyons v. Santa Barbara County Sheriff's Office, 231 Cal.App.4th 1499 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (taxpayer action inappropriate when challenged conduct is purely ministerial or otherwise legal under statute)