Cahaly v. Larosa
25 F. Supp. 3d 817
D.S.C.2014Background
- Cahaly, a Republican political consultant, filed §1983 action challenging South Carolina ADAD statute §16-17-446 and related provisions as applied to political robocalls.
- Plaintiff alleged First Amendment violations, seeking declaratory relief and an injunction, plus state-law false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims.
- Defendants removed the case to federal court; motions included Cahaly’s partial summary-judgment/PI request and Defendants’ summary judgment motion.
- Statutes at issue: §16-17-446 prohibits ADAD calls with exceptions; §16-17-445 imposes disclosure requirements; South Carolina Attorney General opined in 2010 that political ADADs could be allowed under certain conditions.
- SLED investigated robocalls targeting six female Democratic candidates; Cahaly admitted responsibility for the calls; warrants were issued in 2010 and later dismissed in 2012.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §16-17-446’s restriction on political robocalls violate the First Amendment? | Cahaly: content-based restriction on political speech. | LaRosa/Lloyd: statute is content-neutral or facially neutral with legitimate purpose. | Content-based restriction; unconstitutional; partial SJ granted |
| Are the disclosure requirements (compulsory-speech) constitutional? | Disclosures force speech about political content. | Maryland v. Universal Elections permits neutral disclosures. | Unconstitutional as applied due to content-based trigger |
| Is Cahaly able to challenge vagueness given standing? | Challenged vagueness of terms like 'calls of a political nature'. | Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge vagueness. | Plaintiff lacks standing; vagueness challenge not resolved on merits |
| Are Defendants entitled to qualified immunity for damages on Cahaly's §1983 claim? | Damages for First Amendment violation allowed if clearly established. | Qualified immunity shields officials absent clearly established rights. | LaRosa and Lloyd entitled to qualified immunity for damages |
Key Cases Cited
- Maryland v. Universal Elections, Inc., 729 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2013) (disclosure requirements upheld under intermediate scrutiny when content-neutral)
- Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2013) (content neutrality requires censorial purpose evidence)
- Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (content-neutral vs content-based distinction principles)
- Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 2013) (practical test for content neutrality in speech regulations)
- National Federation of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2005) (underinclusiveness scrutiny for speech regulations)
- R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (content-based restrictions require strict scrutiny)
- Jones v. City of Columbia, 301 S.C. 62 (1990) (probable cause standard for false imprisonment/malicious prosecution in SC)