Cady v. Schroll
298 Kan. 731
| Kan. | 2014Background
- Plaintiff Angela Cady sued her obstetrician, Dr. John Schroll, and his employer Women’s Care, P.A., alleging Schroll inappropriately touched and sexually harassed her during prenatal visits; she later settled with Schroll and dismissed claims against him.
- Cady alleged Women’s Care was vicariously liable and independently liable (negligent supervision, failure to warn, failure to implement safeguards) because it knew of prior Board discipline and had issued a "letter of concern."
- Women’s Care moved for dismissal/summary judgment; the district court treated it as summary judgment and granted it, concluding K.S.A. 40-3403(h) barred Women’s Care’s liability; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
- The Kansas Supreme Court granted review to decide whether K.S.A. 40-3403(h) bars independent (direct) liability for a health care provider whose alleged negligence arises from another covered provider’s professional services.
- The central factual posture: all asserted damages derive from Schroll’s conduct (a covered provider); Women’s Care is also a covered provider under the HCPIAA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether K.S.A. 40-3403(h) bars vicarious liability of a covered health care provider for another covered provider | Cady did not dispute vicarious-liability bar but argued statutory exceptions might apply (not pursued here) | K.S.A. 40-3403(h) clearly abolishes vicarious liability between covered providers | Held: statute bars vicarious liability; summary judgment proper on that claim |
| Whether K.S.A. 40-3403(h) bars independent/direct liability for negligent supervision when damages derive from another covered provider’s acts | Cady argued McVay/related cases were wrongly decided or distinguishable and that Women’s Care had an independent duty to supervise | Women’s Care argued McVay and Lemuz interpret the statute to bar any responsibility (including independent liability) for injuries "arising out of" another covered provider’s services | Held: reaffirmed McVay/Lemuz — the statute bars any responsibility (including independent liability) when damages are derivative of another covered provider’s professional services |
| Whether prior cases (Aldoroty, Glassman) changed or limit McVay/Lemuz so Women’s Care could be liable | Cady relied on Aldoroty/Glassman to argue there remain circumstances to impose liability where duties are separate or both providers actively caused injury | Women’s Care maintained those cases are distinguishable: they involved duties/acts that were not merely failures to supervise another covered provider and injuries did not "arise out of" only the other provider’s services | Held: Aldoroty/Glassman do not overrule McVay/Lemuz; they are distinguishable and permit liability only where the defendant’s own negligent acts (not derivative failures) caused injury |
| Whether the statutory language should be reinterpreted (overruling McVay/Lemuz) to allow negligent-supervision claims | Cady urged textual/syntactic readings favoring a narrower bar (e.g., "vicarious" modifying both terms) or application of Marquis on "arising out of" | Court relied on legislative history, rules of construction, and precedent to interpret ambiguous terms broadly consistent with HCPIAA purpose | Held: court affirmed McVay/Lemuz interpretation; declined to overrule — statute ambiguous but legislative intent supports broad bar to avoid double coverage |
Key Cases Cited
- McVay v. Rich, 255 Kan. 371 (Kan. 1994) (interpreted K.S.A. 40-3403(h) to bar not only vicarious liability but any responsibility, including independent liability, where injury arises from another covered provider’s services)
- Lemuz v. Fieser, 261 Kan. 936 (Kan. 1997) (affirmed McVay’s reading of K.S.A. 40-3403(h))
- Aldoroty v. HCA Health Servs. of Kan., Inc., 265 Kan. 666 (Kan. 1998) (distinguished McVay where hospital’s own employees negligently breached duties independent of physician services)
- Glassman v. Costello, 267 Kan. 509 (Kan. 1999) (recognized statutory abrogation of vicarious liability but allowed direct liability where defendant breached its own duties in patient care)
- Marquis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 265 Kan. 317 (Kan. 1998) (interpreted "arising out of" in insurance-exclusion context to focus on theory of liability rather than causation; discussed but not adopted here)