Cadle Co. v. D'ADDARIO
2011 Conn. App. LEXIS 464
Conn. App. Ct.2011Background
- In 1985, decedent executed a $1,000,000 note to the Bank of New Haven.
- Decedent died in 1986; coexecutors (sons) administered the estate.
- Bank transferred the note to Cadle Company in 1994; Cadle filed suit in 2002 to collect.
- Defendants answered in 2006 with three counterclaims (CUTPA, abuse of process, vexatious litigation).
- Trial court rejected counterclaims and later instructed about evidence; jury found in Cadle’s favor on principal, interest substitute rate, and collection costs.
- Judgment entered March 1, 2010; postjudgment interest and costs awarded; defendants appealed and plaintiff cross-appealed on delinquency charge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the prayer for relief was legally sufficient | Cadle Brown (Cadle) contends § 45a-400 authorizes recovery in collection action. | D'Addarios argue the prayer seeks nonmoney relief or improper relief under § 52-350a(13). | Prayer for relief determined to be legally sufficient; it seeks a money judgment. |
| Whether the court properly struck the counterclaims | Cadle argues lack of viable abuse of process, vexatious litigation, and CUTPA bases. | D'Addarios contend counterclaims were factually supported and legally sufficient. | Abuse of process and vexatious litigation counts struck; remaining CUTPA portions limited and some stricken; others dismissed on summary judgment. |
| Whether the verdict should be set aside or a new trial granted | Cadle asserts evidence rulings supported the verdict. | D'Addarios claim evidentiary rulings were prejudicial and evidence was improperly admitted/excluded. | Motion to set aside denied; defendant record on articulation insufficient for review. |
| Whether postjudgment interest was properly awarded | Cadle argues statutory rate applies under § 37-3a after judgment. | D'Addarios contend note’s rate governs; § 37-3a inapplicable due to contract. | Statutory postjudgment interest reversed; note rate governs; remand for calculation under note terms. |
| Whether the delinquency charge was recoverable on cross appeal | Cadle contends delinquency charge is permissible default interest, not an impermissible late fee. | D'Addarios insist delinquency charge is an unlawful penalty late fee. | Delinquency charge is a default interest rate; reversed for cross appeal; remand to award per note. |
Key Cases Cited
- Keller v. Beckenstein, 122 Conn. App. 438 (Conn. App. 2010) (§ 45a-363/45a-400 procedural, not standalone actions)
- Falls Church Group, Ltd. v. Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn, LLP, 281 Conn. 84 (Conn. 2007) (probable cause and vexatious litigation standards)
- Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corp., 184 Conn. 607 (Conn. 1981) (ascertainable loss under CUTPA)
- Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Napert-Boyer Partnership, 40 Conn. App. 434 (Conn. App. 1996) (late charges and penalties; default vs late fee distinction)
- Little v. United National Investors Corp., 160 Conn. 534 (Conn. 1971) (contract rate after maturity; freedom to contract regarding post-maturity interest)
- Globe Investment Co. v. Barta, 107 Conn. 276 (Conn. 1928) (historical interpretation of post-maturity interest)
- Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490 (Conn. 1987) (primary vs incidental motives in abuse of process)
- Genua v. Logan, 118 Conn. App. 270 (Conn. App. 2009) (contract interpretation; plenary review)