Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co.
51 Cal. 4th 764
| Cal. | 2011Background
- Cabral's husband Adelelmo Cabral died following a collision with a Ralphs tractor-trailer that had stopped on the freeway shoulder for a nonemergency snack.
- Horn, a Ralphs driver, stopped 16 feet from the outermost traffic lane in an area marked for emergency parking.
- The area permitted emergency parking; the sign had existed since 2001 and Horn saw it.
- The jury found Horn negligent and Cabral negligent, allocating 90% fault to Cabral and 10% to Horn; damages were awarded to Cabral's widow.
- The Court of Appeal reversed, holding Ralphs owed no legal duty to Cabral; the Supreme Court granted review.
- The Court holds that there is a general duty of reasonable care under Civ. Code §1714 and declines a categorical no-duty rule for stopping alongside freeways.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is there a duty of ordinary care to avoid harm when stopping on the freeway shoulder for nonemergency reasons? | Cabral argues Ralphs driver owed a duty of ordinary care to other freeway users. | Ralphs argues no duty should extend to stopping for nonemergency purposes on a shoulder. | No categorical exemption; duty exists. |
| Do Rowland factors justify immunizing drivers from liability for stopping alongside freeways for discretionary purposes? | Rowland factors support imposing duty to exercise ordinary care. | Rowland factors justify creating a no-duty rule. | No public policy-based exemption; general duty applies. |
| Was the evidence sufficient to support causation between Horn's stop and Cabral's death? | Horn's stop was a substantial factor in causing the collision. | Even if negligent, causation or policy could negate liability. | Substantial evidence supports causation; no superseding cause per se. |
| Do public policy considerations justify immunizing stopping on the shoulder from liability? | Public policy does not justify immunity given foreseeability and corrective incentives. | Immunity would promote road safety and minimize burdens on drivers. | No clear public policy supporting an exemption. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108 (Cal. 1968) (established multi-factor duty considerations; not a blanket exemption)
- Ballard v. Uribe, 41 Cal.3d 564 (Cal. 1986) (foreseeability and policy analysis applied to duty; cautions against overbroad exemptions)
- Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol, 26 Cal.4th 703 (Cal. 2001) (duty analysis and role of jury in determining negligence under regime of duty)
- Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal.2d 60 (Cal. 1954) (special circumstances informs duty; distinguishes ordinary third‑party risk from protected duty)
- Bryant v. Glastetter, 32 Cal.App.4th 770 (Cal. App. 1995) (foreseeability/connection impact on duty analysis; not controlling here but referenced for proximity of risk)
- Capolungo v. Bondi, 179 Cal.App.3d 346 (Cal. App. 1986) (causation/parking ordinance considerations; distinguishable from freeway emergency context)
- Whitton v. State of California, 98 Cal.App.3d 235 (Cal. App. 1979) (duty vs. breach; discusses emergency stopping context on freeway shoulder)
- Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 15 Cal.4th 456 (Cal. 1997) ( Rowland framework for duty analysis; balancing factors)
