Cabasug v. Crane Company, 1:12-cv-00313

Background

Plaintiffs Robert and Joyce Cabasug sued multiple defendants alleging asbestos exposure at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (1973–2006) caused Robert Cabasug’s mesothelioma; claims include negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, loss of consortium, and punitive damages.
Maxim Evaporators (Maxim) was sued as successor to Emhart Manufacturing (Emhart), alleged manufacturer of distillers on submarines Cabasug worked on; Plaintiffs contend Emhart/Maxim supplied asbestos-containing components or replacement parts.
Viad Corp (Viad) was sued as successor to several entities in a chain including Griscom-Russell Company (GRC) and various Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton (BLH) entities (BLH-PA, BLH-DE, BLH, Inc.), alleged suppliers of distillers or replacement asbestos parts.
Court applied maritime-law causation framework requiring (1) proof of exposure to a defendant’s product and (2) that the product was a substantial factor in causing injury; mere presence is insufficient—must show sufficiently high exposure to permit a non-conjectural inference of causation.
The court found no specific evidence that Emhart/Maxim or GRC/Viad (or BLH-PA) actually supplied asbestos-containing original or replacement parts to which Cabasug was exposed; generalized expert assertions about OEM practice were insufficient.
Regarding BLH-DE (a subsidiary of Armour) plaintiffs failed to present a reasoned basis to treat Armour/Viad as liable for a subsidiary’s liabilities (no veil-piercing showing). Court granted summary judgment for Maxim and Viad.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Causation as to Maxim/Emhart — did Cabasug get exposed to asbestos from Emhart products or replacements?	Cabasug worked on Emhart distillers and OEMs typically supplied asbestos gaskets/parts and repair kits, so exposure is attributable to Emhart/Maxim.	Emhart did not manufacture or attach insulation/gaskets; no specific evidence Emhart supplied asbestos-containing original or replacement parts to PHNS.	No genuine issue — Plaintiffs failed to show specific evidence Emhart/Maxim supplied asbestos parts or that Cabasug was exposed to them; summary judgment for Maxim.
Successor liability as to Maxim — did Maxim succeed to Emhart’s liabilities?	(Implicit) Maxim is successor to Emhart and thus liable if exposure shown.	Even assuming succession, plaintiff must show exposure to predecessor’s asbestos; none shown.	Court assumed succession for motion purposes but granted summary judgment because causation was not established.
Causation as to Viad/GRC and BLH-PA — did Cabasug get exposed to asbestos from GRC or BLH-PA products?	GRC distillers and BLH replacement parts were in service historically; expert testimony says BLH sold replacement parts into 1960s–1970s.	GRC dissolved long before Cabasug’s service; BLH-PA ceased to exist in 1965 and there is no specific evidence BLH-PA supplied asbestos parts used by Cabasug.	No genuine issue — no evidence GRC or BLH-PA supplied asbestos parts to which Cabasug was exposed; summary judgment for Viad on those bases.
Successor/parent liability as to Viad for BLH-DE/BLH, Inc. (subsidiary) — can Viad be held liable for BLH-DE’s sales?	Plaintiffs argue BLH (generally) sold replacement parts through the 1970s and that assets moved between entities, implying liability flows to Viad.	BLH-DE was a separate Armour subsidiary; corporate separateness prevents parent liability absent alter-ego/veil-piercing, which plaintiffs did not prove.	No genuine issue — plaintiffs failed to show facts supporting piercing the corporate veil or treating BLH-DE as Armour/Viad’s alter ego; summary judgment for Viad.

Key Cases Cited

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (party opposing summary judgment must present facts establishing essential elements)
Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Tr., 424 F.3d 488 (6th Cir.) (plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant’s product and that product was a substantial factor)
United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998) (parent corporation generally not liable for subsidiary’s acts absent circumstances warranting disregard of corporate form)
Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998 (9th Cir.) (expert opinions at summary judgment must have a factual basis)
Guidroz-Brault v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 254 F.3d 825 (9th Cir.) (expert must back opinion with specific facts at summary judgment)