Cabasug v. Crane Co.
989 F. Supp. 2d 1027
D. Haw.2013Background
- Plaintiff Robert Cabasug, a Navy pipefitter at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (1973–2006), developed mesothelioma and sued multiple manufacturers/suppliers for negligence, strict liability, and failure to warn based on asbestos in products and replacement parts.
- Court previously held maritime law governs the dispute.
- Central factual disputes: which defendants’ products (original or replacement parts) Cabasug actually worked on and whether those products contained asbestos supplied by the defendant.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment on causation and duty-to-warn grounds; Plaintiffs sought summary adjudication that manufacturers must warn if they knew or designed for asbestos components.
- The court considered both direct and circumstantial evidence of exposure (prevalence of equipment, job duties, technical manuals, purchase orders, and expert testimony) and addressed replacement-part liability separately.
- Rulings: summary judgment granted for Ametek (S&K successor); denied for Cleaver Brooks; denied in part for Aurora and Crane (claims about gaskets/packing survive; claims about external insulation and certain other parts dismissed); Plaintiffs’ broad duty-to-warn motion denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard for causation under maritime law | Lindstrom is too strict; Ninth Circuit would allow proof by presence + fiber drift (Lockwood approach). | Lindstrom/MDL approach: must prove exposure to each defendant’s product and that it was a substantial factor. | Court adopts Lindstrom: plaintiff must show exposure to each defendant’s product and that the product was a substantial factor; context-specific (no rigid checklist). |
| Proof of exposure to replacement parts | Plaintiff: manufacturers that designed/expected asbestos components should owe a duty/warning and can be liable for replacement-part exposures. | Defendants: liability limited to products they placed in the stream of commerce; not liable for third-party replacement parts. | Court follows Conner/Lindstrom: no duty to warn and no liability for asbestos-containing replacement parts a defendant did not manufacture or distribute. |
| Sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to defeat summary judgment | Plaintiff: prevalence of a defendant’s equipment plus regular job duties and expert testimony (every exposure increases risk) can raise a genuine issue. | Defendants: mere presence on a vessel or speculative allegations are insufficient; need specific, substantial exposure evidence. | Court: circumstantial evidence can suffice (prevalence of product + regularity of plaintiff’s work + experts), but mere presence is insufficient; evaluate facts per defendant. |
| Plaintiffs’ motion for a categorical duty to warn | Plaintiffs seek a legal rule requiring duty to warn when a manufacturer knew/spec’d asbestos components or could foresee maintenance exposures. | Defendants oppose a categorical rule; duty must be addressed in context of each defendant’s conduct and supply chain. | Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion as premature; will assess duty to warn fact-by-fact for each defendant. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lindstrom v. A-C Product Liability Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2005) (maritime asbestos causation requires proof of exposure to the defendant’s product and that the product was a substantial factor)
- Conner v. Alfa Laval, 842 F. Supp. 2d 791 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (under maritime law manufacturers owe no duty to warn of hazards in replacement parts they did not manufacture or distribute)
- Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986) (frequency, regularity, and proximity test for circumstantial proof of asbestos exposure)
- Lockwood v. AC & S, Inc., 744 P.2d 605 (Wash. 1987) (presence in workplace plus fiber-drift expert testimony can support causation — contrasted by majority approach)
- In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing state approaches and causation standards in asbestos cases)
- O’Neil v. Crane Co., 53 Cal.4th 335 (Cal. 2012) (manufacturer not liable for hazards arising exclusively from other manufacturers’ replacement parts)
- Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875 (1997) (maritime law is a uniform federal body drawn from common-law rules and modifications)