Cabarrus Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Dep't of State Treasurer, 374 N.C. 3

In 2014 the General Assembly enacted an anti–pension‑spiking statute requiring the Retirement System Board of Trustees to "adopt a contribution‑based benefit cap factor" recommended by the actuary so that no more than 0.75% of retirement allowances are capped (N.C.G.S. §135‑5(a3)).
The Board’s actuary recommended a cap factor; the Board approved initial and subsequent factors via meeting resolutions (actuary recommended 4.8; later adopted 4.5).
Dr. Barry Shepherd retired in 2015; the Retirement System determined his pension was capped and invoiced Cabarrus County Board of Education for $208,405.81; the Board paid the amount and then challenged the invoice.
The Board of Education sought declaratory relief arguing the cap factor is a "rule" requiring formal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) rulemaking; the Retirement System argued the statutory process for adopting actuarial assumptions (and board adoption via minutes/resolution) sufficed and implicitly excluded APA rulemaking.
Trial court granted summary judgment for the Board of Education; the Court of Appeals affirmed. The N.C. Supreme Court granted discretionary review and affirmed the Court of Appeals: the cap factor is a rule subject to APA rulemaking and the prior adoptions without APA compliance were invalid.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Board's adoption of a contribution‑based cap factor is a "rule" subject to the APA	The cap factor is a rule and must be adopted through APA rulemaking; adoptions by resolution were invalid	The statute contemplates board adoption based on an actuary recommendation (and longstanding practice of adopting actuarial items by resolution), so APA rulemaking is not required	Supreme Court: cap factor meets the APA definition of a rule and is subject to APA rulemaking; adoption without APA compliance was improper
Whether N.C.G.S. §135‑5(a3) / §135‑6(l) implicitly exempts the Retirement System from APA rulemaking	No implicit exemption; exemption must be explicit or manifest; the APA presumptively applies	The specific retirement statutes and §135‑6(l) (actuary as technical adviser; acceptance via minutes) are specialized and thus control over the general APA	Court: statutes can be harmonized with the APA; they do not clearly or manifestly rebut the APA’s application, so no implicit exemption exists
Whether courts must defer to the agency’s interpretation that "adopt" means informal adoption by resolution	Agency interpretation should not override statutory construction; courts decide applicability of APA	Agency contends its longstanding practice and expertise merit deference	Court: agency interpretation not persuasive here; statutory construction is a judicial function and deference does not avoid APA requirements

Bring v. N.C. State Bar, 348 N.C. 655, 501 S.E.2d 907 (1998) (where an organic statute provided a complete rulemaking scheme, APA procedures were not required)
Vass v. Bd. of Trs., 324 N.C. 402, 379 S.E.2d 26 (1989) (General Assembly must expressly exempt an agency from APA to avoid APA application)
Empire Power Co. v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t, Health & Nat. Res., 337 N.C. 569, 447 S.E.2d 768 (1994) (statutes in pari materia should be reconciled and an implied amendment to the APA will not be found unless repugnancy is manifest)
Wells v. Consol. Judicial Ret. Sys. of N.C., 354 N.C. 313, 553 S.E.2d 877 (2001) (courts have the duty to construe administrative statutes; agency interpretation has limits)
Nat’l Food Stores v. N.C. Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 268 N.C. 624, 151 S.E.2d 582 (1966) (specific statute controls over a general statute when conflict is irreconcilable)
High Rock Lake Partners, LLC v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 366 N.C. 315, 735 S.E.2d 300 (2012) (specific statutory language can control where clear and unambiguous)
Piedmont Publ’g Co. v. City of Winston‑Salem, 334 N.C. 595, 434 S.E.2d 176 (1993) (read statutes together; avoid readings producing illogical results)
In re Halifax Paper Co., 259 N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963) (legislative intent to amend or repeal must be manifest to imply an exemption)