C.W.H. v. L.A.S.
538 S.W.3d 488
| Tenn. | 2017Background
- Parents (unmarried) entered an agreed parenting plan in 2011 naming Mother primary residential parent; Father had substantial parenting time. Father later sought modification.
- In 2013 Mother relocated the children from Ohio/Tennessee to Nevada and (according to evidence) worked as a legal prostitute at the Moonlight Bunny Ranch; Father learned of this after a settlement conference and filed for emergency custody.
- Juvenile court found a material change in circumstances (Mother's deceit about relocation/employment, prior prostitution, and hostility toward Father), designated Father primary residential parent, and later conducted a best-interest analysis under Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-106 as amended in 2014.
- Court of Appeals vacated and remanded for best-interest analysis, then reversed the juvenile court on remand, finding the juvenile court had relied improperly on Mother’s prostitution and had not weighed Father’s negative conduct; it ordered immediate transfer of custody to Mother.
- Tennessee Supreme Court granted review, held the Court of Appeals misapplied the abuse-of-discretion/standard-of-review rules, that the 2014 §36-6-106 amendment (procedural) could govern the juvenile court’s analysis, and that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering immediate mandate without allowing Father to seek Rule 11 review.
- Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, affirmed juvenile court’s designation of Father as primary residential parent, and remanded for orderly return of the children to Father.
Issues
| Issue | Father's Argument | Mother's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper standard of review for trial court custody findings | Appellate court should defer to juvenile court findings; reverse only if evidence preponderates against trial court or abuse of discretion | Court of Appeals treated some factual findings less deferentially | Supreme Court: apply Armbrister standard—de novo review with presumption of correctness; defer to trial court on credibility and factual findings unless evidence preponderates otherwise |
| Whether material change in circumstances was shown | Father: Mother’s deceit, relocation/employment, and hostility toward Father constitute material changes affecting children | Mother: Prostitution and deceit alone aren’t material without showing effect on children; Court of Appeals limited findings | Supreme Court: Mother’s hostility finding was affirmed and unappealed; because that finding stands, threshold for modification was met (no need to revisit prostitution issue) |
| Which version of §36-6-106 governs best-interest analysis | Father: juvenile court permissibly relied on 2014 amendment (procedural) | Mother: earlier statute should apply to proceedings begun in 2013 | Supreme Court: statute is procedural; juvenile court could apply 2014 amendment. Juvenile court considered appropriate factors and did not abuse discretion |
| Whether Court of Appeals could order immediate transfer of custody | Father: immediate mandate was improper because he sought Rule 11 review and no emergency danger was shown | Mother: (implicitly) mandate appropriate under appellate judgment | Supreme Court: ordering immediate issuance of mandate in custody case without stay was improper absent danger; mandate should have awaited Father’s opportunity for Rule 11 review |
Key Cases Cited
- Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685 (Tenn. 2013) (standard of review and deference to trial court custody findings)
- Brooks v. Carter, 993 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. 1999) (intermediate appellate court should not expedite mandate in custody cases absent danger; allow Rule 11 review)
- Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82 (Tenn. 2001) (trial court discretion in custody matters; reversal only outside spectrum of reasonable outcomes)
- Kelly v. Kelly, 445 S.W.3d 685 (Tenn. 2014) (deference to trial court credibility determinations in parenting cases)
- Keisling v. Keisling, 92 S.W.3d 374 (Tenn. 2002) (directing returns to physical custody in least disruptive manner)