C.S. v. State of Indiana
2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 76
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- C.S., age 9–10 during proceedings, was alleged to have molested his then 3–4-year-old stepsister A.G. at his mother and David Gray’s home; the offense would be Level 4 felony if committed by an adult.
- Initial DCS investigation in July 2014 closed as unsubstantiated; a new investigation in April 2015 led to recorded Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC) interviews of A.G. and J.G.
- A.G.’s April 13, 2015 CAC interview (when she was four) contained explicit statements that C.S. undressed her, put his penis inside her vagina, and kissed her; her July 2014 CAC interview did not contain such allegations.
- The State sought to admit A.G.’s out-of-court CAC interview under Indiana’s “protected person” child-hearsay statute; A.G. testified at an admissibility hearing and was cross-examined; the court admitted the CAC interview at the admissibility hearing.
- At the delinquency adjudication, A.G.’s CAC interview and her admissibility-hearing testimony (incorporated by agreement) were admitted; no physical or other circumstantial evidence corroborated the allegation; J.G.’s CAC interview was not admitted and his live testimony did not inculpate C.S.
- The juvenile court adjudicated C.S. delinquent; on appeal C.S. argued the evidence was insufficient because A.G.’s testimony was “incredibly dubious.”
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence was sufficient to support delinquency finding beyond a reasonable doubt | State: A.G.’s CAC interview and hearing testimony provided direct proof; admissible under the protected-person statute | C.S.: A.G.’s testimony was incredibly dubious (equivocal, contradictory, possibly coached), and there was no corroboration | The court affirmed: a reasonable fact-finder could credit A.G.’s CAC interview and testimony; evidence was sufficient |
| Whether incredible-dubiosity rule applies to bar conviction based on a single witness | State: testimony was reliable enough; CAC interview consistent and admissible | C.S.: single-witness testimony here was inherently improbable/contradictory and unsupported by circumstantial evidence | Court applied the rule’s threshold and concluded A.G.’s combined statements were not incredibly dubious and rule did not require reversal |
| Admissibility and evidentiary weight of J.G.’s statements | State: argued J.G.’s CAC interview tended to inculpate C.S. | C.S.: J.G.’s live testimony was non-inculpatory; his CAC interview was not admitted | Court held J.G.’s CAC interview was not admitted and his live testimony did not support the finding; decision rested solely on A.G. |
| Whether ambiguities in A.G.’s live hearing testimony (e.g., statements about being told what to say) fatally undermined her CAC interview | State: hearing equivocations attributable to child’s stress; CAC interview was clear and consistent | C.S.: hearing statements showed possible coaching or suggestion by adults (mother/Cheryl) | Court: ambiguities could be reasonably resolved in favor of the State; the CAC interview was consistent and probative, so ambiguities did not defeat sufficiency |
Key Cases Cited
- Jordan v. State, 512 N.E.2d 407 (discussing juvenile adjudications and criminal standards) (Ind. 1987)
- Al-Saud v. State, 658 N.E.2d 907 (holding State must prove delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt when act would be criminal) (Ind. 1995)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (establishing beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard) (U.S. 1970)
- Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133 (single-witness testimony can support conviction) (Ind. 2012)
- Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749 (describing the incredible-dubiosity rule and its standards) (Ind. 2015)
- Smith v. State, 779 N.E.2d 111 (young-child testimony may show confusion; inconsistencies do not mandate reversal if reasonable basis exists) (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
- Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618 (jury may credit explanations for changed testimony) (Ind. 2001)
- T.G. v. State, 3 N.E.3d 19 (intent in child-molesting cases may be inferred from conduct and age difference) (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)
- Murray v. State, 761 N.E.2d 406 (contradictions between trial and pretrial statements do not automatically render testimony incredibly dubious) (Ind. 2002)
- Davenport v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1226 (same) (Ind. 1997)