C. R. Klewin Northeast, LLC v. State
299 Conn. 167
| Conn. | 2010Background
- C.R. Klewin Northeast, LLC contracted with the State DPW in Oct. 1998 to construct facilities at Manchester Community College and encountered delays and overruns.
- August 31, 2001, Klewin submitted a detailed request for $2,678,256 in contract overruns to the department’s facilities chief.
- April 15, 2004, Klewin hand-delivered a letter to the DPW commissioner outlining the project, the overruns, and the prior informal efforts to obtain payment, asserting a right to payment.
- DPW and governor officials subsequently discussed the claim; the governor authorized a settlement of $1.2 million in Mar. 2005, but Klewin was never paid.
- Nov. 27, 2007, Klewin filed suit under General Statutes § 4-61(a) seeking to compel payment of the disputed claim.
- The trial court dismissed the action, holding Klewin failed to provide adequate § 4-61(a) notice; the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 4-61(a) require explicit intent to sue in the notice? | Klewin argues notice need only describe the claim and factual basis, not state intent to sue. | State contends notice must include intent to pursue action against the state. | No explicit intent required; notice of a claim and its factual bases suffices. |
| What level of factual detail is required in § 4-61(a) notice? | The April 15, 2004 letter provided sufficient factual detail supporting the claim. | Not specified or detailed enough to meet statutory requirements. | The notice was adequate given its contract details, timeline, and supporting context. |
| Is the plaintiff’s April 15, 2004 letter adequate notice under the legislative history of § 4-61? | Legislative history shows liberal construction to avoid defeating meritorious claims. | Not addressed; court should limit interpretation to statutory text. | Yes; legislative history supports liberal construction; April 15, 2004 letter sufficed. |
| Did the trial court improperly construe § 4-61(a) by relying on noncontract analogies? | The plain text governs; no need for interpretations from unrelated statutes. | Reasoning by analogy was appropriate to gauge notice sufficiency. | Court properly rejected restrictive analogies and followed plain language. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dept. of Transportation v. White Oak Corp., 287 Conn. 1 (2008) (statutory notice and purpose of § 4-61—as a liberal, not punitive, notice requirement)
- Dept. Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553 (1999) (statutory aims to improve process and cost efficiency in public works disputes)
- Bacon Construction Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 294 Conn. 695 (2010) (jurisdiction and sovereign immunity; dismissal standards for § 4-61)
- Felician Sisters of St. Francis of Connecticut, Inc. v. Historic District Commission, 284 Conn. 838 (2008) (use of multiple terms implying different meanings within statute)
- Hinchliffe v. American Motors Corp., 184 Conn. 607 (1981) (statutory interpretation: context and language guide meaning)
- Warkentin v. Burns, 223 Conn. 14 (1992) (notice requirements analyzed in defective highway context)
- Salgado v. Commissioner of Transportation, 106 Conn.App. 562 (2008) (notice requirements analyzed in a transportation context)
- Chambers v. Electric Boat Corp., 283 Conn. 840 (2007) (workers' compensation notice principles and statutory interpretation)