C People of Michigan v. Carl Lee Harbenski
356731
| Mich. Ct. App. | Mar 31, 2022Background
- Defendant Carl Lee Harbenski pleaded no-contest to felony charges and was sentenced by videoconference during the COVID-19 pandemic.
- MCR 6.006(A) authorizes videoconferencing for certain criminal proceedings, expressly including misdemeanor sentencings, but by implication does not authorize felony sentencings by videoconference.
- At the videoconference hearing defense counsel coordinated the appearance and defendant did not expressly waive his right to be physically present; the court did not secure a personal waiver.
- The trial court proceeded with sentencing by videoconference; on appeal the court concluded the trial court plainly erred in doing so.
- The majority remanded for resentencing (or for sentencing after an express waiver), but held — for the first time in this context — that the lack of in-person sentencing was a structural constitutional error that satisfies plain-error prejudice prong.
- Judge Boonstra concurred in the remand but disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the error is structural constitutional error, cautioning the court against expanding structural-error doctrine without focused briefing and noting the narrow class of structural errors identified in precedent.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Harbenski’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether sentencing a felony defendant by videoconference without the defendant’s personal waiver complied with court rule and procedure | Videoconference sentencing was permissible under exigent circumstances and no objection was made at the time | Trial court plainly erred: MCR 6.006(A) does not authorize felony sentencings by videoconference and no personal waiver was obtained | Trial court plainly erred; remand for in-person sentencing or for sentencing after an express personal waiver |
| Whether the videoconference sentencing error is a constitutional error (not merely rule-based) | Majority: it implicates the constitutional right to be present and thus is constitutional error | Concurrence: parties did not brief constitutional issue; record insufficient to declare constitutional error | Majority treated it as constitutional error; concurrence declined to reach that issue fully |
| Whether the error is a structural constitutional error that automatically satisfies plain-error prejudice and presumptively the fourth-prong | Majority: such an error is structural and thus satisfies Carines prejudice prong and presumptively the fourth prong | Concurrence: structural-error category is narrow per Supreme Court precedent (Neder/Johnson); inappropriate to expand without briefing | Majority declares error structural and remands; concurrence agrees with remand but would not label the error structural |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Heller, 316 Mich. App. 314 (2016) (discussed videoconference sentencing and remanded for resentencing consideration)
- People v Mallory, 421 Mich. 229 (1984) (mentioned stages at which defendant has right to be present but did not hold lack of in-person sentencing is structural error)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (explained harmless-error framework and that structural errors are a narrow class)
- Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (harmless-error jurisprudence referenced)
- People v Carines, 460 Mich. 750 (1999) (articulated four-prong plain-error test applied on appeal)
- Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997) (noted very limited class of structural errors)
- People v Milbourn, 435 Mich. 630 (1990) (sentencing-remand and individualized sentencing considerations)
- United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005) (addresses resentencing procedures on appeal)
- United States v. Davern, 970 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1992) (dissent cited by Heller)
- United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1987) (addressed oral sentence controlling over written commitment discrepancy)