C People of Michigan v. Robert Arthur Johnson Jr, 353825

Defendant (Robert Johnson Jr.) sent an obscene, threatening message to BP shortly after release from jail; he admitted sending it and that BP had been a witness against him.
Defendant was charged under Michigan’s witness-retaliation statute, MCL 750.122(8), which prohibits retaliating or threatening to retaliate against a witness by killing, injuring, or damaging property.
At trial defendant conceded the message frightened BP but argued it was crude invective and expressions of hope, not an actual threat to kill or injure.
The trial court instructed the jury using M Crim JI 37.6 (augmented by M Crim JI 4.16). During deliberations, jurors asked whether psychological injury counts as “injury”; the court answered yes (listing bodily injury, disfigurement, chronic pain, or mental anguish) after briefly consulting counsel.
The jury convicted; the concurrence (Judge Ronayne Krause) agrees with the majority that a new trial is required but for a narrower reason: the trial court’s answer to the jury’s question likely misled the jury into relying on actual injury rather than the issuance of a threat.
The concurrence accepts that a “threat” for the statute must be a “true threat” (per Virginia v. Black) and finds the pre-deliberation instructions, as given and considered in context, sufficiently conveyed that intent requirement; she also finds the evidence sufficient to support conviction on the true-threat theory.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the statute/jury instruction required the "true threat" standard	Instruction (M Crim JI 37.6 + 4.16) adequately limited convictions to threats to kill or injure	The message was invective/hyperbole, not a true threat; instruction insufficient	Concurrence: true-threat standard applies, and instructions as given (viewed as a whole) adequately informed jury of intent requirement
Whether "injury" in the statute includes psychological injury	Court answered juror question that "injury" includes mental anguish	Defense implied statutory "injury" should be physical; the jury note revealed confusion	Concurrence: not necessary to resolve here; psychological-injury issue is a red herring for this appeal
Whether the trial court’s response to the jury’s question was proper/harmless	Answer clarified types of injury (including mental anguish)	Response likely misled jurors to think actual injury or psychological harm was an element	Concurrence: trial court erred; its answer compounded jury confusion and created unacceptable danger of conviction on improper basis—warranting new trial
Sufficiency of the evidence to support witness-retaliation conviction	Evidence (message content and effect) was sufficient to show a true threat	Defendant argued message lacked an expression of intent to carry out harm	Concurrence: evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to support conviction under true-threat theory

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (defines "true threat" as serious expression of intent to commit unlawful violence)
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (content-based speech restrictions and secondary-effect analysis)
People v. Kelly, 423 Mich. 261 (1985) (jury instructions must be read as a whole and in context)
People v. Traver, 502 Mich. 23 (2018) (instruction-review principles)
People v. Morris, 450 Mich. 316 (1995) (rule of lenity inapplicable to Michigan Penal Code)
TM v. MZ, 326 Mich. App. 227 (2018) (discussing threats and related standards)