C.P.M. v. Shelby County Department of Human Resources
185 So. 3d 461
Ala. Civ. App.2015Background
- Child born 2010; parents unmarried but paternity undisputed. DHR removed the child at birth, returned her within a month; later removed again when parents violated a court order by cohabiting; returned after services were completed.
- In early 2013 parents separated; mother dated J.K.; an altercation on Feb. 18, 2013 led to the father being shot (mother owned the gun); the child was present. DHR investigated and found the abuse/neglect report “not indicated.”
- DHR removed the child two more times overall; at the time of termination both children (the subject child and a younger sibling) were in foster care together. DHR’s permanency plan for the younger child was reunification; for the subject child DHR sought termination because the child had been in custody three times.
- DHR witness (Morris) testified mother completed recommended services, had no substance-abuse or mental-health limitations, and had unsupervised visitation five days a week; DHR’s concerns focused on mother’s associations with men (father and J.K.) and father’s anger/temper and unstable lifestyle.
- Trial occurred over several days in 2013; juvenile court entered an order terminating both parents’ rights on Nov. 9, 2014 — ~11 months after the final day of testimony. Parents moved to alter/vacate; motion denied. Parents appealed; appeals consolidated.
- On appeal the court reversed the termination as to the mother for lack of clear and convincing evidence and reversed as to the father because the juvenile court violated the 30-day rule for entry of judgment (Rule 25(D) and § 12-15-320(a)) and the delay prejudiced the father and child.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether judgment terminating mother’s rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence | Mother: record lacks clear and convincing evidence of abuse/neglect; she completed services and had unsupervised visitation; DHR witness called her a good mother | DHR: repeated removals, parents’ lifestyle, mother’s poor choices of partners (exposure of child to dangerous situations) justify termination | Reversed as to mother — record did not contain clear and convincing evidence to terminate her rights |
| Whether the juvenile court’s ~11-month delay in entering judgment prejudiced father and required reversal | Father: judgment could not reflect his current circumstances after 11 months; affidavits showed changed circumstances and prejudice from delay | DHR/juvenile court: (implicit) error was procedural and did not warrant reversal | Reversed as to father — violation of Rule 25(D)/§ 12-15-320(a) and undue delay prejudiced father and child; remanded |
| Whether the child was "dependent" / parents unable or unwilling to discharge responsibilities (statutory grounds) | Parents: no evidence they abused or neglected the child; issues were relational and not parenting fitness; alternative less drastic measures available | DHR: child had been in and out of care due to parents’ faults and habits; lack of substantial lifestyle change indicated future risk | Appellate court found insufficient evidence to meet the high bar for termination as to the mother; father’s termination reversed on procedural/prejudice grounds; case remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- F.I. v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 975 So.2d 969 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (standard of appellate review in termination cases; factual findings based on ore tenus presumed correct)
- Ex parte State Dep’t of Human Res., 834 So.2d 117 (Ala. 2002) (presumption of correctness to trial-court findings based on conflicting ore tenus evidence)
- J.C. v. State Dep’t of Human Res., 986 So.2d 1172 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (articulating clear-and-convincing standard in parental-rights terminations)
- Ex parte Beasley, 564 So.2d 950 (Ala. 1990) (requirement to consider and reject viable alternatives before terminating parental rights)
- D.O. v. Calhoun Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 859 So.2d 439 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (existence of current-condition evidence is implicit in requirement of clear and convincing proof)