C.G. v. J.H.
172 A.3d 43
Pa. Super. Ct.2017Background
- Child J.W.H. born 2006 in Florida via intrauterine insemination during a same-sex relationship; J.H. is the biological mother.
- C.G. lived with J.H. and the child for ~6 years; parties separated in early 2012, after which J.H. and child moved to Pennsylvania.
- C.G. filed for shared legal custody and partial physical custody in December 2015 claiming both parental and in loco parentis status.
- J.H. filed preliminary objections asserting C.G. lacked standing, disputing C.G.’s characterization of her role (saying C.G. was a partner/babysitter, not a co-parent).
- Trial court held evidentiary hearings, found conflicting testimony, and concluded C.G. was neither a legal parent nor in loco parentis; it sustained the standing objection and dismissed the complaint.
- On appeal, C.G. challenged the legal standard applied, the in loco parentis finding, the weight given to post-separation conduct, and argued she was a parent under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(1).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (C.G.) | Defendant's Argument (J.H.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether C.G. is a “parent” under 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(1) | Biology should not control; C.G. jointly conceived and raised the child and thus is a parent | At birth C.G. was not legally a parent (no marriage/second-parent adoption); under Pa. law “parent” means biological or adoptive parent | Court: Not a parent under §5324(1); Pennsylvania precedent treats nonbiological nonadoptive partners as third parties |
| Whether C.G. stood in loco parentis (standing under §5324(2)) | C.G. acted as a co-parent for six years (care, household, presence at birth, beneficiary on policy) | J.H.: C.G. was largely a partner/babysitter, did not make parental decisions, provided only household contributions, minimal post-separation contact | Court: After hearing, found C.G. did not assume parental duties or decision-making and thus lacked in loco parentis status |
| Proper legal standard for deciding standing on preliminary objections | Trial court should have applied the demurrer “clear and free from doubt” standard (or not weigh evidence to deny standing) | Where factual disputes exist, the court may hold an evidentiary hearing under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1028(c)(2) and resolve credibility; standing must be proved at hearing | Court: No error—because the court held a factual hearing, it properly resolved disputed facts and was not bound to the demurrer standard |
| Whether post-separation conduct was improperly given excessive weight | Once standing exists it does not vanish; post-separation inactivity alone should not defeat standing | Post-separation conduct is relevant to whether in loco parentis ever existed; courts may weigh it alongside pre-separation conduct | Court: Proper to consider post-separation conduct; here it supported conclusion that C.G. never assumed parental status |
Key Cases Cited
- T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001) (defines in loco parentis, sets stringent test and deference to trial court findings)
- J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. 1996) (same-sex partner treated as third party; outlines factors supporting in loco parentis)
- Bupp v. Bupp, 718 A.2d 1278 (Pa. Super. 1998) (consideration of whether third party lived with child and natural parent in family setting)
- D.P. v. G.J.P., 146 A.3d 204 (Pa. 2016) (authorizes early resolution/bifurcation of contested standing issues under Child Custody Law)
- S.A. v. C.G.R., 856 A.2d 1248 (Pa. Super. 2004) (examines psychological bond evidence for in loco parentis status)
- K.W. v. S.L., 157 A.3d 498 (Pa. Super. 2017) (standing challenges treated under Rule 1028(a)(5); standing must be proven)