C.F. Bean L.L.C. v. Suzuki Motor Corp.
841 F.3d 365
| 5th Cir. | 2016Background
- In 2012 Mark Barhanovich died after his boat’s Suzuki outboard struck a submerged dredge pipe; the swivel bracket broke and the motor flipped into the boat, killing him.
- Bean (C.F. Bean, Bean Meridian, Archer Western) operated the dredging and was sued in consolidated maritime proceedings; Bean later settled the estate’s claims and C.F. Bean pled guilty in a related criminal case.
- Bean filed a third-party products-liability indemnity/contribution claim against Suzuki Motor Corporation (SMC); expert disclosure deadlines were set (initial experts Oct. 20, 2014; rebuttal Dec. 5, 2014).
- Bean timely designated mechanical engineer Edward Fritsch in Oct. 2014 but his initial report did not opine on design/manufacturing/warning defects; Bean produced a second, substantively different report (dated July 15, 2015) late in discovery.
- The district court struck both of Fritsch’s reports (first for insufficiency, second as untimely), denied Bean’s request to test the seized motor, and granted summary judgment for SMC because Bean lacked admissible expert proof; Bean appealed.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed exclusion of the first report, reversed exclusion of the second report (finding exclusion too harsh), reversed summary judgment, and affirmed denial of motor-testing as discovery-reopening abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Bean) | Defendant's Argument (SMC) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court properly excluded Fritsch’s first expert report | First report was sufficient to show swivel-bracket structural failure and causation | Report was conclusory and failed to connect defect theory to data; not responsive to defect/warning/design issues | Affirmed exclusion — first report was conclusory and inadequate under Rule 702/Daubert |
| Whether the district court properly excluded Fritsch’s second (untimely) report | Second report was either a timely supplement (Rule 26(e)) or exclusion was an abuse of discretion given discovery timing and importance | Second report was untimely and prejudicial; sanction of exclusion was appropriate | Reversed exclusion — report was untimely but exclusion was overly harsh; continuance/rebuttal and fee-shifting were preferable sanctions |
| Whether denying Bean’s late request to test the motor (reopen discovery) was an abuse of discretion | Testing necessary to prove design/manufacturing defect; Coast Guard custody and parallel criminal investigation delayed access | Request made after close of discovery and near trial; Bean could have sought a stay or earlier relief; reopening would prejudice schedule | Affirmed denial — district court did not abuse discretion in refusing to reopen discovery for eleventh-hour testing |
| Whether summary judgment for SMC was proper given exclusion of expert testimony | Summary judgment improper because exclusion of key expert should be reversed; expert was necessary to create factual dispute | With expert testimony excluded, Bean cannot meet its burden on technical products-liability elements | Reversed summary judgment — because the second expert should not have been excluded as sanction, summary judgment premised on that exclusion must be vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (expert admissibility standard under Rule 702)
- Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (courts may exclude ipse dixit expert conclusions)
- Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787 (Fifth Circuit factors for untimely-expert exclusion: explanation, importance, prejudice, continuance)
- Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (limits on using Rule 26(e) to extend expert-disclosure deadlines)
- Betzel v. State Farm Lloyds, 480 F.3d 704 (reversal appropriate where excluded testimony is critical to nonmovant’s case)