C.B.S. v. J.S.D.
2016 UT 56
| Utah | 2016Background
- Mother (C.B.S.) gave birth in Aug 2014, was incarcerated shortly after, and left the child (E.K.S.) with her sister and brother-in-law (Adoptive Parents).
- Adoptive Parents filed a private petition that was converted to a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights while Mother remained incarcerated.
- Mother requested court-appointed counsel; the juvenile court denied the request stating a public defender was not available because the petition was privately initiated, citing Utah Code § 78A-6-1111(2).
- The juvenile court made no finding on Mother's indigency and did not perform the Lassiter balancing analysis before proceeding; Mother was unrepresented at trial and parental rights were terminated.
- Mother appealed, arguing both facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to § 78A-6-1111(2) and that due process required appointment of counsel under Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.
- The Utah Supreme Court held that privately initiated termination proceedings involve sufficient state action to trigger due process protections, rejected the facial challenge to § 78A-6-1111(2), but found the juvenile court erred by refusing counsel without conducting an indigency determination and the Lassiter analysis; the case was remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether privately initiated parental termination triggers state-action constitutional protections | Mother: constitutional protections apply because only the state can terminate parental rights | Adoptive Parents: privately initiated action lacks sufficient state action for Fourteenth Amendment protections | Court: privately initiated terminations do involve sufficient state action to trigger due process protections |
| Whether Utah Code § 78A-6-1111(2) is facially unconstitutional under Lassiter | Mother: statute categorically bars appointment of counsel in private actions, conflicting with Lassiter | State/Adoptive Parents: statute may limit discretion but does not facially violate due process because counsel is not required in all cases | Court: facial challenge fails — statute is not facially unconstitutional |
| Whether the juvenile court properly denied counsel based solely on § 78A-6-1111(2) | Mother: court should have determined indigency and applied Lassiter balancing to decide if counsel required | Adoptive Parents: court may rely on statutory prohibition; they concur court erred in not doing Lassiter analysis but argue appellate court could decide | Court: juvenile court erred by denying counsel without finding indigency and applying Lassiter; remand required for those determinations |
| Remedy and next steps | Mother: entitlement to appointed counsel on remand and possible fees if indigent | Adoptive Parents: no mandate that counsel be appointed absent Lassiter showing; appellate court should not decide Lassiter analysis first | Court: remanded for trial court to determine indigency and then apply Lassiter (as informed by In re K.A.S.) before appointing counsel; denied fee claim for now |
Key Cases Cited
- Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (announces three-factor due process balancing test to determine when appointment of counsel is required in parental-termination proceedings)
- M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holds that privately initiated proceedings terminating parental rights implicate state authority and constitutional protections)
- Swayne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 795 P.2d 637 (Utah 1990) (Utah precedent recognizing sufficient state action when private parties effectuate state termination of parental rights)