C.A.U.S.E. (A Texas Unincorporated Nonprofit Association) v. Village Green Homeowners Association, Inc., 531 S.W.3d 268

Village Green Homeowners Association (the Association) governed by a Declaration of Covenants recorded in 1998; Paragraph 3.20 requires owners to have refuse collected or disposed of by the owner at the owner’s expense.
In 2014 the Board decided to require all residents to use a single trash/recycling provider (Vaquero), voted to adopt Vaquero’s proposal, and entered a sole-provider contract effective March 10, 2015.
The Association informed residents to contract with Vaquero and restricted other haulers’ access (e.g., changing gate codes), which disrupted some existing service arrangements.
C.A.U.S.E., an association formed to bring this suit, sued Village Green asserting multiple claims including declaratory relief, tortious interference, antitrust, negligence, and breach of restrictive covenants; the trial court ordered threshold briefing on (1) whether the Board had authority to compel a single provider and (2) whether such conduct would be a per se antitrust violation.
Both parties moved for summary judgment on the threshold issues; the trial court ruled the Association had authority and granted Village Green’s summary judgment.
The Fourth Court of Appeals reversed, holding Paragraph 3.20 unambiguously assigns individual homeowners the duty to arrange and pay for trash collection and that general powers to manage common areas do not authorize compelling a single provider absent a clear, specific covenant.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the Association may compel owners to use a Board-selected single waste provider	Paragraph 3.20 requires owners to arrange and pay for their own collection; Board lacks express authority to force a single provider	Board points to general Declaration/bylaws powers to manage/maintain common areas, contract for services, and statutory presumption of reasonableness	Held: Association does not have authority as a matter of law to compel homeowners to use a Board-selected sole provider; Paragraph 3.20 controls and is unambiguous
Whether general management powers (and related Board actions) allow exclusion of other haulers without amending the Declaration	Plaintiff: General powers cannot override specific trash covenant; ambiguous provisions must be construed in favor of least restriction	Defendant: General powers to promote health, safety, and to contract for services permit a single-provider rule to reduce traffic and maintenance costs	Held: Specific covenant (Paragraph 3.20) prevails over general authorities; general provisions do not render the trash covenant superfluous, so exclusionary policy is unauthorized

Inwood N. Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1987) (restrictive covenants create reciprocal property interests and define owners’ rights)
Pilarcik v. Emmons, 966 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. 1998) (restrictive covenants construed under general contract principles; ascertain parties’ intent from instrument)
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Texas Utilities Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1999) (when contract is unambiguous, its construction is a question of law)
Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) (when both parties move for summary judgment, appellate court reviews both records and renders proper judgment)
Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1981) (mere disagreement over interpretation does not create ambiguity)
Laverie v. Wetherbe, 517 S.W.3d 748 (Tex. 2017) (standard of review for summary judgment is de novo)