Byron Black v. Wayne Carpenter
866 F.3d 734
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- In 1986 and 1988 Byron Black committed violent shootings; he was convicted for a 1988 triple murder and sentenced to death (one death sentence, two life sentences).
- Black filed state post-conviction and then federal habeas petitions, raising an Atkins claim (mental retardation/intellectual disability) that would bar execution.
- After Atkins (prohibiting execution of mentally retarded persons), Tennessee law defined intellectual disability with three elements: IQ ≤ 70, adaptive deficits, onset by 18. Tennessee initially applied a strict bright-line IQ 70 rule (Howell) but later overruled that in Coleman to permit consideration of SEM, Flynn Effect, and other expert evidence.
- Black’s record includes childhood group-administered IQ scores (83–97), adult scores in the 70s (73–76), and later tests (2001) of 69 and 57; experts disputed how to weigh SEM, Flynn Effect, and whether later deficits show onset before 18.
- The Sixth Circuit remanded for Coleman-based de novo review; the district court reviewed the full habeas record, denied an evidentiary hearing, and found Black failed to prove intellectual disability by a preponderance. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Black's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of remand | District court should have conducted a full merits hearing and consider additional evidence beyond state record | Remand was for de novo review of the record under Coleman; district court could consider federal record and did so | Remand was properly limited to reviewing the record under Coleman; district court did not err in its scope |
| Evidentiary hearing | Black needed an evidentiary hearing to present expert testimony (e.g., Tassé, Greenspan) | District court could resolve claim on existing record; no new evidence identified that wasn't already in record | Denial of an evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion |
| Standard of proof/summary-judgment treatment | District court should have applied summary-judgment principles and drawn inferences for Black | Habeas Atkins claim requires petitioner to prove elements by preponderance; not a Rule 56 summary-judgment proceeding | Summary-judgment principles do not apply; Black bore burden to prove intellectual disability by preponderance |
| Merits: Intellectual disability (IQ/Onset) | IQ scores should be adjusted downward for SEM and Flynn Effect; later low scores show lifelong disability with onset before 18 | Childhood group-administered scores, school performance, and lack of referral rebut lifelong-onset claim; SEM/Flynn adjustments not dispositive | Black failed to prove IQ ≤70 before age 18 by preponderance; district court’s factual findings not clearly erroneous; Atkins relief denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (prohibiting execution of mentally retarded offenders)
- Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014) (explaining limits on rigid IQ cutoffs and recognizing SEM ranges)
- Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) (invalidating nonmedical indicators untethered to clinical standards)
- Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015) (discussing evidentiary issues in intellectual-disability claims)
- Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221 (Tenn. 2011) (Tennessee Supreme Court: courts may consider SEM, Flynn Effect, practice effects, and expert opinion in Atkins analysis)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (limits on expanding state-court record for AEDPA review)
- Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992) (preponderance standard for habeas factfinding)