638 B.R. 821
Bankr. D.N.M.2022Background
- Plaintiff Barry J. Byrnes (pro se) sued his estranged wife, Sylvia M. Byrnes, in New Mexico state court for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) arising from a July 2018 domestic dispute and subsequent statements to police and court.
- Four of six state-law claims were dismissed; only defamation and IIED remained.
- Debtor Sylvia Byrnes filed Chapter 7 on October 30, 2020; Plaintiff removed the tort claims to bankruptcy court and moved to withdraw the reference to the district court (motion pending).
- The bankruptcy court adopted a narrow construction of “personal injury tort” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) and concluded defamation is not a personal injury tort.
- The court held the IIED claim appears parasitic (based entirely on alleged defamatory statements) and may be subject to dismissal, but in any event its gravamen is defamation so the bankruptcy court can try both claims.
- The court declined to remand and set the matter for a bench trial in Las Cruces, reserving the district court’s right to withdraw the reference.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper scope of “personal injury tort” in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5) | § 157(b)(5) should cover broad category of torts including defamation and emotional harms | Exception should be narrow, covering physical trauma or severe psychiatric injury | Court adopts the narrow view: requires bodily trauma or psychiatric impairment beyond mere shame/humiliation |
| Is defamation a § 157(b)(5) personal injury tort? | Defamation involves personal harm and emotional injury, so it falls within § 157(b)(5) | Defamation does not involve physical trauma or severe psychiatric injury and therefore is not a § 157(b)(5) personal injury tort | Held: defamation is not a personal injury tort under the narrow interpretation |
| Viability of IIED claim predicated on alleged defamatory statements | IIED pleaded as independent tort; seeks emotional-distress relief in addition to defamation damages | IIED is duplicative/parasitic when based solely on alleged defamation and may be barred | Court: IIED likely unviable where gravamen is defamation; may be dismissed or disposed on summary judgment, but remains in this action for now |
| Whether bankruptcy court or district court should try the claims / withdraw reference | Plaintiff seeks withdrawal so district court will try personal-injury claims | Defendant opposes withdrawal; urges bankruptcy court to adjudicate since claims are not § 157(b)(5) personal injury and gravamen is defamation | Court: will try claims in bankruptcy court (bench trial in Las Cruces) and recommends denial of reference withdrawal; district court may still withdraw if it disagrees |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Gawker Media LLC, 571 B.R. 612 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2017) (adopts narrow construction of “personal injury tort”)
- In re Residential Capital, LLC, 536 B.R. 566 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (uses gravamen analysis to decide whether emotional‑distress claim requires withdrawal)
- In re Cohen, 107 B.R. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holds personal injury exception is limited to traditional bodily‑injury claims)
- Massey Energy Co. v. W. Va. Consumers for Justice, 351 B.R. 348 (E.D. Va. 2006) (construes § 157(b)(5) narrowly to physical injury claims)
- Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011) (addressing limits of bankruptcy court authority; § 157(b)(5) is not jurisdictional)
- Grimes v. Carter, 50 Cal. Rptr. 808 (Ct. App. 1966) (IIED cannot be asserted independently where gravamen is defamation)