Butler v. Mitchell, 815 F.3d 87

1991: Massachusetts district court issued a criminal complaint charging Reginald Butler with rape; no immediate public accusation or indictment followed.
1993: While jailed on unrelated charges, Butler signed a standard form requesting a speedy trial; the case remained dormant for years.
1999: Commonwealth obtained an indictment and Butler was arraigned in superior court; trial began in 2003 and resulted in conviction; direct appeal unsuccessful.
2008: Butler moved for a new trial in state court, arguing appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising a speedy-trial violation; state courts denied relief.
2013: Butler filed a federal habeas petition raising Sixth Amendment speedy-trial and ineffective-assistance claims; the district court denied relief, and Butler appealed to the First Circuit.
First Circuit reviewed under AEDPA de novo to determine whether the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent (Barker/Doggett) in rejecting the claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When did Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right attach?	Butler: right attached at issuance of 1991 criminal complaint.	Commonwealth: federal right attaches at indictment/arrest/public accusation.	Held: Attachment under Sixth Amendment began with the 1999 indictment, not the 1991 complaint.
Whether the delay violated the Sixth Amendment (Barker factors; presumptive prejudice)	Butler: >10 years delay (per state law) and prolonged pretrial delay violated speedy-trial rights and should trigger presumptive prejudice under Doggett.	Commonwealth: Relevant federal delay was ~4 years from indictment to trial, much of it caused or agreed to by defendant; only 310 days chargeable to Commonwealth, so no presumptive prejudice.	Held: No Sixth Amendment violation; SJC did not unreasonably apply Barker/Doggett given four-year delay and limited chargeable delay.
Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising speedy-trial claim	Butler: counsel should have argued speedy-trial violation on direct appeal.	Commonwealth: Failure to raise a losing speedy-trial claim is not ineffective assistance.	Held: Ineffective-assistance claim fails because the underlying speedy-trial claim fails.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four-factor balancing test for speedy-trial claims)
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992) (presumptive prejudice from extreme delay; significance increases with length of delay)
Marion v. United States, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (speedy-trial right attaches on indictment, arrest, or similar public accusation)
United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982) (discussion of attachment of speedy-trial right)
Rashad v. Walsh, 300 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2002) (Massachusetts criminal complaint alone does not start Sixth Amendment clock)
United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986) (speedy-trial right tied to public accusation or arrest)
Pharm v. Hatcher, 984 F.2d 783 (7th Cir. 1993) (circuit precedent requiring more than a complaint to start speedy-trial clock)
Favors v. Eyman, 466 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1972) (similar view that complaint alone may not trigger federal speedy-trial right)