Butler v. Drive Automotive Industries of America, Inc.
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12188
| 4th Cir. | 2015Background
- Brenda Butler was hired through temporary agency ResourceMFG to work on Drive Automotive Industries’ factory floor; she wore ResourceMFG uniform, was paid by ResourceMFG, and ResourceMFG formally handled discipline and termination.
- Butler alleges repeated verbal and physical sexual harassment by Drive supervisor John Green, reported incidents to both ResourceMFG and Drive supervisors, and was ultimately removed from Drive after Drive requested replacement.
- Butler sued Drive and ResourceMFG under Title VII; the parties dismissed ResourceMFG and the district court granted summary judgment to Drive, finding ResourceMFG was Butler’s sole employer.
- The Fourth Circuit reviewed whether multiple entities can be “employers” under Title VII and what test applies to joint-employer questions.
- The court adopted a hybrid joint-employer test (blending common-law agency/control and economic-realities factors), articulated nine relevant factors (with three most important: hire/fire authority, day-to-day supervision, and where/how work occurs), and applied them to hold Drive was a joint employer with ResourceMFG.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Can one worker have multiple "employers" under Title VII? | Butler: Yes; joint-employer doctrine applies so both entities can be liable. | Drive: Implicitly conceded doctrinal possibility but argued it was not Butler’s employer here. | Yes — multiple entities may be joint employers under Title VII. |
| Which legal test governs joint-employer status under Title VII? | Butler: Economic-realities test (focus on economic dependence). | Drive: Control/common-law agency test (focus on hiring/firing and supervisory control). | Adopted hybrid test combining control and economic-realities; control is principal guidepost. |
| What factors should assess joint-employer status? | Butler: (favored economic dependence factors) | Drive: (favored control/hiring-firing factors) | Court set nine non-dispositive factors (hire/fire; day-to-day supervision; equipment/place of work; employment records; duration; training; duties; sole assignment; parties’ intent), highlighting hire/fire, supervision, and work locus as most important. |
| Was Drive a joint employer of Butler on the summary-judgment record? | Butler: Drive exercised significant control (scheduling, training, supervision, assignment, ability to request termination). | Drive: ResourceMFG paid, disciplined, and terminated Butler, so Drive was not her employer. | Held Drive and ResourceMFG are joint employers as a matter of law; reversed summary judgment and remanded for merits. |
Key Cases Cited
- Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (controls/common-law agency is principal guidepost)
- Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (common-law control important in analogous ADA context)
- Cilecek v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 115 F.3d 256 (4th Cir.) (approved hybrid considerations and emphasized control)
- Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979 (4th Cir.) (adopted hybrid test and Spirides factors)
- Haavistola v. Community Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211 (4th Cir.) (applied hybrid approach in Title VII context)
- Bristol v. Board of County Comm’rs, 312 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir.) (joint-employer concept: shared control of essential terms/conditions)
- Graves v. Lowery, 117 F.3d 723 (3d Cir.) (control-based analysis for joint employment)
- Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir.) (source of multi-factor test used in hybrid analysis)
- Schultz v. Capital International Security, Inc., 466 F.3d 298 (4th Cir.) (used joint-employment analysis in analogous FLSA context)