Bustos v. a & E TELEVISION NETWORKS
646 F.3d 762
| 10th Cir. | 2011Background
- Bustos, a federal inmate at Florenc e supermax, was shown on A&E's Gangland: Aryan Brotherhood, implying he was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood.
- Bustos alleges the broadcast damaged his reputation and exposed him to threats and placement restrictions.
- Bustos sued A&E in Colorado court for defamation, claiming the program false/defamatory statements harmed his public reputation.
- The district court granted summary judgment for A&E, ruling the statement was substantially true under Colorado law.
- The issue on appeal is whether the challenged statement was a material falsehood so as to support a defamation claim, given public-concern context and material-falsehood requirements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the statement is defamatory under Colorado law | Bustos argues the broadcast harmed his reputation as a member of the Aryan Brotherhood. | A&E contends the statement is defamatory but should be evaluated as to truth. | Yes, the statement is defamatory. |
| Whether the statement contains a material falsehood | Bustos contends the misstatement is not substantially true. | A&E maintains any inaccuracies are not material or are outweighed by truth. | No actionable material falsehood; the statement is substantially true. |
| How material falsehood is evaluated in public-concern contexts under Colorado law | Material falsehood should be shown to significantly harm reputation vis-à-vis truth. | Materiality balances harm against truth; substantial truth defeats liability. | Material falsehood requirement screens trivial claims and, here, is not met. |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate given undisputed facts | Disputed facts about truth could support liability. | Undisputed facts show the challenged statement was not a material falsehood. | Summary judgment affirmed; no material falsehood shown. |
| Whether the discrepancy between being a member vs. an accessory affected materiality | The program’s nuance could matter to public perception. | Differences between membership and aid/abetment do not create a material falsehood here. | Not material; differences not significantly altering public perception. |
Key Cases Cited
- Gomba v. McLaughlin, 504 P.2d 337 (Colo. 1972) (material falsehood requirement screens actionable claims)
- Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (U.S. 1991) (minor inaccuracies not actionable if core truth remains)
- Anderson v. Cramlet, 789 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1986) (summary judgment permissible on falsity materiality questions)
- Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (recognizes material falsehood as a falsity standard in defamation cases)
- Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broad., Co., 659 P.2d 1351 (Colo. 1983) (defamation involves harm to reputation; falsity and publication required)
- Smiley's Too, Inc. v. Denver Post Corp., 935 P.2d 39 (Colo. App. 1996) (Colorado requires proof of falsity; clear-and-convincing evidentiary standard in public-concern cases)