Buster v. Commonwealth, 2012 Ky. LEXIS 162

Appellant Harold Buster was convicted of multiple counts of first-degree sexual abuse and sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment.
On appeal, he challenges notice of charges, a denied directed verdict, and post-sentencing jurisdiction for court costs and a public-defender fee.
Court affirms convictions and sentence but reverses the costs/fees portion and remands for further proceedings.
Indictment originally charged two counts of first-degree rape and over thirty counts of first-degree sexual abuse involving two victims identified by initials K.A.T. and K.S.T.
Trial began February 22, 2011 after the Commonwealth later provided more specific bills of particulars, including victim identities and more precise timeframes.
The court ultimately held that notice was adequate and that the trial court erred in retaining jurisdiction to assess costs/fees after sentencing, remanding for cost/fee determinations.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the notice of charges constitutionally adequate?	Buster argues notice was inadequate due to generic indictment and delayed disclosure.	Commonwealth contends sufficient notice existed via indictment and later particulars.	Yes; notice was adequate and due process satisfied.
Should the trial court have granted a directed verdict based on credibility/timing of testimony?	Buster asserts victims’ testimony was unreliable given time elapsed.	Commonwealth contends testimony credible and sufficient for jury verdict.	No; reasonable jurors could convict based on credibility and other evidence.
May the trial court retain jurisdiction after sentencing to assess court costs and public-defender fees?	Buster argues post-sentence jurisdiction is unlawful for costs/fees.	Commonwealth argues such determinations can occur post-conviction under statutes.	Remanded; trial court erred in retaining post-sentence jurisdiction for costs/fees; remand for cost/fee determinations.
Should court costs and partial public-defender fees be reconsidered on remand?	Indigence or inability to pay may affect costs/fees.	Statutes require timely determinations of costs and potential partial fees.	Yes; remand appropriate to determine entitlement to cost exemptions and any partial-fee obligations.

Deskins v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 520 (Ky. 1974) (sufficient bill of particulars where information available to defendant)
Welch v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.2d 909 (Ky. 1951) (prosecution must provide all reasonably necessary information)
Wolbrecht v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 533 (Ky. 1997) (bill of particulars guidance; enabling defense to prepare)
Benham v. Commonwealth, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991) (directed-verdict standard; credibility issues for jury to resolve)
Coney Island Co. v. Brown, 290 Ky. 750, 162 S.W.2d 785 (Ky. 1942) (directed-verdict exception for impossible testimony; generally credibility-based)
Maynes v. Commonwealth, 361 S.W.3d 922 (Ky. 2012) (court costs indigence considerations; timing at sentencing)
Prater v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 898 (Ky. 2002) (jurisdiction to modify after final judgment limited; cost considerations)
Bolin v. T & T Mining, 231 S.W.3d 130 (Ky. 2007) (finality of judgments; policy against lingering judgments)
Baze v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 761 (Ky. 2008) (finality and related considerations in sentencing)
McHargue v. Sizemore, 438 S.W.2d 338 (Ky. 1969) (finality principle in litigation)