Bussey v. Ray Brandt Nissan, Inc., 2:17-cv-04886

Kendall Bussey, an African-American ex-employee, was terminated by Ray Brandt Nissan and signed a document titled "General Release of All Claims" after a meeting on January 2, 2014.
Bussey alleges that at the initial meeting Ray Brandt's agent Ed Merida brandished a firearm and threatened Bussey and his lawyer-friend Gilbert Andry, causing Bussey to fear for his safety.
Bussey left the initial meeting without signing; later that day he met privately with Ray Brandt’s lawyer, Terry Alarcon, and signed the release after being told he could take more time to review it.
The release recited substantial monetary consideration and stated it released "all claims whether direct, indirect, or derivative, arising from the subject employment and sale," including unknown and future claims.
Bussey filed an EEOC charge alleging race discrimination, received a right-to-sue letter, and then sued under Title VII and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law.
Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing the release barred Bussey’s discrimination claims; Bussey opposed, arguing the release did not cover such claims and that his consent was vitiated by duress.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the release covers Bussey’s employment discrimination claims	Release limited to claims related to sale and final compensation, so it does not bar discrimination claims	Release language is broad ("all claims ... arising from the subject employment and sale") and thus bars employment-related claims	Court: Granted — release language is clear and unambiguous and encompasses Bussey’s claims
Whether Bussey’s consent to the release was vitiated by duress	Bussey signed under fear caused by Merida’s alleged firearm threats; consent lacked mutuality	Any duress dissipated because Bussey initially left, then signed later in private with counsel and was told he could take more time	Court: Denied (for summary judgment) — factual dispute survives; insufficient record to resolve duress at this stage

Clovelly Oil Co., LLC v. Midstates Petroleum Co., LLC, 112 So.3d 187 (La. 2013) (governs Louisiana contract interpretation and common intent rule)
Campbell v. Melton, 817 So.2d 69 (La. 2002) (parol/extrinsic evidence admissible only if contract ambiguous)
Ortego v. State, Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 689 So.2d 1358 (La. 1997) (parol evidence rule principles)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burden-shifting principles)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (standard for genuine issue of material fact at summary judgment)
Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir.) (nonmovant cannot rely on conclusory allegations to defeat summary judgment)