468 P.3d 419
Or.2020Background
- Scott Busch was struck in a Portland crosswalk by McInnis Waste Systems’ garbage truck, suffered catastrophic injury and underwent above‑knee amputation.
- Defendant conceded liability; jury awarded $3,021,922 in economic damages and $10,500,000 in noneconomic damages.
- Defendant moved under ORS 31.710(1) to reduce noneconomic damages to the statutory cap of $500,000; trial court granted the reduction.
- The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed; the Supreme Court granted review.
- The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: application of ORS 31.710(1) here violates the remedy clause of Article I, §10 of the Oregon Constitution because the statute provides no quid pro quo, the cap is not calibrated to restore the right in many cases or over time, and the legislature’s insurance‑cost rationale is insufficient to outweigh the constitutional right to a remedy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ORS 31.710(1)’s $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages violates Article I, §10 as applied to Busch | Busch: cap eliminates or emasculates the common‑law remedy without a constitutionally adequate quid pro quo | McInnis: award of full economic damages plus $500,000 noneconomic is a "substantial" remedy; Greist controls | Held: Cap, as applied, violates Article I, §10 — no quid pro quo, cap not calibrated to provide substantial remedy in many cases, legislature’s reasons insufficient |
| Proper analytical framework: Greist (pre‑Horton) vs. Horton | Busch: Horton governs — analysis must weigh departure from common‑law baseline against legislature’s reasons | McInnis: Greist/earlier cases permit treating the $500,000 plus full economic damages as dispositive | Held: Horton controls; courts must measure departure from common‑law model against legislative reasons, not rely solely on relative award size |
| Whether noneconomic damages are of lesser constitutional importance than economic damages | Busch: remedy clause protects the right to a remedy for person injuries generally (both types of damages) | McInnis: noneconomic damages are different in nature and may be treated differently; $500,000 plus full economic damages is substantial | Held: Court refuses to treat noneconomic damages as categorically less protected; both compensate for injury and factor into remedy‑clause analysis |
| Whether legislature’s policy goals (insurance availability/cost) justify cap | Busch: policy goals are societal and do not supply a quid pro quo to injured plaintiffs | McInnis: cap intended to curb litigation/insurance costs and broadened liability; that justifies the limit | Held: Legislative reasons alone (insurance, predictability) are insufficient to counterbalance Article I, §10 when no quid pro quo and cap is not calibrated to restore the right in many serious cases |
Key Cases Cited
- Horton v. OHSU, 359 Or 168 (Or. 2016) (establishes the remedy‑clause framework: measure departure from common‑law baseline against legislature’s stated reasons; quid pro quo and sovereign‑immunity context important)
- Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or 281 (Or. 1995) (upheld the same $500,000 noneconomic cap in a wrongful‑death statutory action; relied in part on historical statutory limits)
- Vasquez v. Double Press Mfg., Inc., 288 Or App 503 (Or. Ct. App. 2017) (Court of Appeals applied Horton‑style analysis to invalidate cap as applied; later proceedings addressed statutory applicability)
- Clarke v. OHSU, 343 Or 581 (Or. 2007) (discussed limits on remedies against public entities and compared remedy adequacy relative to injuries)
- Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or 508 (Or. 1989) (discussed quid pro quo concept: broadened remedy against municipalities paired with a damages cap)
- Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or 62 (Or. 1999) (juror‑trial jurisprudence discussed in later opinions; addressed limits on jury trial guarantees)