Burton v. Glynn County, 297 Ga. 544

Background

Thomas and Lee Burton own Villa de Suenos, an oceanfront single-family residence in an R-6 (one-family residential) zoning district on St. Simons Island.
From 2010–May 2013 the Burtons’ property was repeatedly used and promoted as a wedding/event venue (at least 79 events; many over 100 guests), generating neighbor complaints about noise, traffic, and parking; police issued citations and warnings.
Glynn County determined the property was being used as a commercial event venue in violation of the R-6 ordinance and sent a cease-and-desist; the Burtons sued for declaratory and injunctive relief and alleged constitutional violations; the County counterclaimed.
After an evidentiary hearing the trial court declared the Burtons’ primary use violated Section 701 of the Glynn County Zoning Ordinance and ordered compliance; the court denied equal protection and implicitly rejected vagueness claims.
While the appeal was pending the County moved for contempt alleging continued promotion/booking; the trial court construed its earlier order as declaratory (not an injunction) and denied contempt for lack of jurisdiction; the Supreme Court affirmed the declaratory characterization but vacated the contempt denial insofar as it should have dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Burton)	Defendant's Argument (Glynn County)	Held
Whether using the property as an events venue violates the R-6 zoning ordinance	Occasional accessory events and short-term rentals are permissible; their 4-night minimum shows it’s residential use	Marketing, frequency, size, and cumulative impacts converted accessory use into an impermissible primary commercial venue	Court: Use exceeded customary accessory use; violated §701.2 — affirmed
Equal protection (selective enforcement)	Other nearby rental properties/events were treated differently; discrimination in enforcement	No evidence of similarly situated properties with comparable volume/impact; enforcement was nondiscriminatory	Court: Burton failed to prove unequal treatment — affirmed
Due process / vagueness of ordinance	Ordinance is vague because it doesn’t quantify when accessory use becomes impermissible	Ordinance gives fair warning; need not be mathematically precise; applies clearly here	Court: Ordinance sufficiently specific for fair warning; due process claim rejected — affirmed
Contempt / effect of appeal (supersedeas) and remedy type (declaratory vs. injunctive)	Appeal operated as supersedeas; trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider contempt	County: December order functioned as injunction (not stayed), so contempt appropriate	Court: December order was declaratory, not injunctive; trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide contempt during appeal — it should have dismissed or held motion in abeyance; contempt denial vacated in part

Key Cases Cited

Expedia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 285 Ga. 684 (construction of ordinance is reviewed de novo)
Ervin Co. v. Brown, 228 Ga. 14 (cardinal rule: give effect to legislative intent in ordinance construction)
Cawthon v. Douglas County, 248 Ga. 760 (accessory use can become sufficiently voluminous/mechanized to violate zoning)
Gouge v. City of Snellville, 249 Ga. 91 (selective enforcement is factual; vagueness doctrines discussed)
105 Floyd Road, Inc. v. Crisp County, 279 Ga. 345 (ordinance vagueness standard—no mathematical certainty required)
Baker v. City of Marietta, 271 Ga. 210 (declaring differences between declaratory judgments and injunctions)
Davis v. Harpagon Co., 281 Ga. 250 (appeal generally acts as supersedeas; injunctions excepted)
Pennsylvania Poorboy, Inc. v. Robbins Restaurant, Inc., 238 Ga. 539 (injunction relief is discretionary)
Blair v. Blair, 272 Ga. 94 (trial court may interpret/clarify its own orders)
Wiggins v. Bd. of Commrs., 258 Ga. App. 666 (order requiring compliance with law is declaratory, not injunctive)
Adams v. Madison County Planning & Zoning, 271 Ga. App. 333 (example of an injunction requiring affirmative action)