Burton v. Commissioner of Social Security, 5:15-cv-01039

Background

Burton applied for DIB and SSI alleging disability from November 1, 2011; ALJ denied benefits after a January 2014 hearing; Appeals Council denied review and district court review followed.
Treating psychiatrist Dr. Shantharam Darbe treated Burton frequently from Oct 2011–2013, diagnosing paranoid schizophrenia/bipolar disorder with psychotic features, documenting hospital admission, psychosis, suicide attempts, violent incidents, poor hygiene, and job instability.
On Jan 29, 2013, Dr. Darbe completed a Mental RFC Assessment finding multiple "marked" and "moderate" work-related limitations and wrote a September 2013 letter concluding Burton could not function independently of his parents.
ALJ gave the hospitalization opinions "some weight," assigned Dr. Darbe’s treatment records "partial weight," but assigned the January 2013 MRFCA "no weight," while adopting some limitations consistent with unskilled work (no public contact; only superficial coworker/supervisor contact).
ALJ concluded Burton could perform unskilled, medium jobs (e.g., packager, dishwasher) and was not disabled; district court reversed and remanded, finding the ALJ improperly evaluated the treating physician’s opinion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether ALJ properly weighed treating psychiatrist’s MRFCA	Burton: ALJ failed to give good reasons and did not apply regulatory factors when rejecting Dr. Darbe’s MRFCA	Commissioner: ALJ permissibly discounted the conclusory statement that Burton “cannot function independently,” and accommodated limitations via RFC	Court: ALJ erred—failed to give specific, legitimate reasons and did not adequately apply treating‑physician factors; remand required
Whether ALJ may reject parts of a treating opinion while adopting others without explanation	Burton: ALJ impermissibly picked and chose portions of the MRFCA without explanation	Commissioner: ALJ implicitly relied on other evidence and state agency opinions to discount parts of MRFCA	Held: Error—ALJ must explain why some portions are credited and others rejected; record lacked that explanation
Whether ALJ’s reservation‑of‑decision and claimant‑reported activities justified discounting treating opinion	Burton: ALJ relied improperly on a reserved legal conclusion and minimal reported activities	Commissioner: Statement about independence is a legal conclusion and Burton’s reported activities contradicted disability claim	Held: ALJ misapplied the reserved‑issue rule and misused minimal activities to reject medical findings
Whether the RFC adequately accounted for limitations (esp. adapting to changes)	Burton: RFC omitted marked limitation in ability to respond to changes in work setting and thus failed to address erosion of unskilled base	Commissioner: Limitation to unskilled work can account for certain moderate deficits	Held: ALJ failed to assess or adopt restrictions for marked limitation to adapt to changes; RFC unexplained and possibly inconsistent with unskilled work finding

Key Cases Cited

Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir.) (treating‑physician controlling‑weight test and factors to weigh noncontrolling opinions)
McGoffin v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir.) (ALJ may reject treating opinion only on basis of contradictory medical evidence and must give specific, legitimate reasons)
Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir.) (remand required where ALJ failed to properly evaluate treating opinions)
Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir.) (ALJ erred by rejecting psychological findings not opposed by other medical sources)
Haga v. Astrue, 482 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir.) (ALJ must explain why some portions of a medical opinion are rejected while others are adopted)
Smith v. Colvin, 821 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir.) (limiting to simple, repetitive, routine tasks can sometimes account for certain moderate mental limitations)
Vigil v. Colvin, 805 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir.) (ALJ may account for moderate concentration, persistence, and pace problems by restricting claimant to unskilled work)
Keyes‑Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir.) (harmless‑error standard: reversal appropriate unless no reasonable factfinder could have reached a different conclusion)