Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection
SC19664
| Conn. | Dec 13, 2016Background
- Nancy Burton sued the DEP Commissioner and Dominion Nuclear Connecticut under the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act (§ 22a-14 et seq.), alleging Millstone’s cooling-water withdrawals and discharges cause unreasonable pollution and that the permit renewal process was biased and prejudged.
- Burton initially lost at trial for lack of standing; the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed in Burton I, holding she had standing under § 22a-16 and § 22a-20 and remanding for a hearing on adequacy of the administrative permit renewal proceeding.
- Administrative renewal proceedings continued: hearings were held in 2009, Deputy Commissioner issued a renewal permit on September 1, 2010, and Burton filed an administrative appeal; the trial court did not hold the remand hearing required by Burton I before the permit issued.
- The trial court later consolidated Burton’s § 22a-16 suit with her administrative appeal; defendants moved to dismiss the § 22a-16 action as moot because the permit renewal proceeding had concluded and the permit issued.
- The trial court granted dismissal for mootness; Burton appealed, arguing the court could still provide practical relief (including invalidating the 2010 permit) if it found the administrative proceeding inadequate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the § 22a-16 action is moot after issuance of the renewal permit | Burton: controversy persists because she alleged likely unreasonable pollution and that the renewal proceeding was inadequate; court can still provide relief including invalidating the 2010 permit | Defendants: permit renewal proceeding terminated, so nothing to stay or remand; § 22a-20 refers only to existing/ongoing procedures, so action is moot | Not moot: controversy remains and trial court can grant practical relief (e.g., adjudicate impacts and grant equitable relief under §§ 22a-16, 22a-18) |
| Whether Burton’s remedy was limited to staying the administrative proceeding during its pendency | Burton: remand/hearing was an available remedy but not the exclusive remedy; court retains jurisdiction after administrative action if controversy continues | Defendants: Burton I intended remedy only during the ongoing administrative proceeding; termination removes remedy | Court: Burton I did not limit relief to a stay; trial court could reassert jurisdiction after administrative decision and adjudicate adequacy or invalidate permit |
| Whether "existing administrative and regulatory procedures" in § 22a-20 requires live proceedings | Burton: "existing" means procedures authorized by law, not only currently ongoing proceedings; court may act after agency decision if procedures prove inadequate | Defendants: "existing" means ongoing; once terminated, § 22a-20 no longer supports the action | Court: "existing" means established by law; termination of a particular proceeding does not automatically render a § 22a-16 suit moot if judicial relief would have practical effect |
| Whether plaintiff’s delay or failure to seek an immediate remand/stay makes the action moot | Burton: delay does not eliminate the court’s ability to grant relief now; dismissal for lack of prosecution was not invoked below | Defendants: Burton’s inaction made retroactive relief (e.g., staying past proceedings) unwarranted | Court: Delay does not by itself make the claim moot; the record did not support dismissal for failure to prosecute and practical relief remains possible |
Key Cases Cited
- Burton v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 291 Conn. 789 (Reversed dismissal; plaintiff had standing under § 22a-16 and § 22a-20; remanded for adequacy hearing)
- Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542 (Clarifies scope of issues considered in Burton I)
- Waterbury v. Washington, 260 Conn. 506 (Doctrine of primary jurisdiction and § 22a-18 discretion to remand or retain jurisdiction)
- Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting Council, 286 Conn. 57 (Mootness and subject matter jurisdiction principles)
- Taylor v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 71 Conn. App. 43 (Definition of mootness; practical relief requirement)