Burns v. Martuscello
890 F.3d 77
| 2d Cir. | 2018Background
- Burns, a New York State inmate working in a commissary, was struck by a falling can and reported the workplace injury; a subsequent call allegedly from his wife claimed he was "cut."
- Correctional officers (Shanley, Noeh, Martuscello) pressured Burns to act as an informant (a "snitch") and to change his account to implicate staff; Burns refused.
- Officers threatened that Burns would be placed in Involuntary Protective Custody (IPC) if he did not comply; he was placed in IPC after a hearing and remained there for over six months, severely restricted.
- Burns filed grievances and later sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations; the district court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding no protected First Amendment conduct.
- On appeal the Second Circuit considered whether the First Amendment protects (a) a prisoner’s right to refuse to provide false information, and (b) a prisoner’s right not to serve as a prison informant; it affirmed the district court’s judgment on qualified immunity grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether refusal to provide false statements to prison officials is protected by the First Amendment | Burns: he has a First Amendment right to refuse to fabricate or retract truthful reports | Defendants: prison setting limits First Amendment, and evidence/administrative needs justify compulsion | Held: Yes — right to refuse to provide false information is protected (extends Jackler to prison context) |
| Whether a prisoner has a First Amendment right not to serve as an informant (refuse to snitch) | Burns: compelled snitching forces speech and endangers safety; refusal is protected | Defendants: compelled cooperation aids prison safety; government can require evidence ("every man’s evidence") | Held: Yes — right not to serve as an informant is protected where compulsion is unrelated to legitimate penological needs |
| Whether placement in IPC constituted adverse action causally connected to protected conduct | Burns: IPC placement and officers’ threats were retaliation for refusal to snitch | Defendants: placement based on safety concerns, not retaliation | Held: Burns produced sufficient evidence of adverse action and causation to survive summary judgment |
| Whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity | Burns: rights violated were established enough to defeat immunity | Defendants: First Amendment right not clearly established in prison context at the time | Held: Defendants entitled to qualified immunity because the rights recognized were not clearly established at the time of Burns’s IPC placement |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2011) (First Amendment protects refusal to make false statements to government and to retract truthful reports)
- Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (First Amendment protects the right not to be compelled to convey an ideological message)
- West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory affirmation of belief violates First Amendment freedom of thought)
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (framework for assessing reasonableness of prison regulations affecting constitutional rights)
- United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (the public’s right to evidence does not eliminate other constitutional protections)