Burns v. Johnson, 18 F. Supp. 3d 67

Background

Burns, a part-time civilian Program Assistant in the Federal Air Marshal Service (Boston), coordinated scheduling for international air marshal missions.
Shortly after Supervisory Agent in Charge David Johnson arrived, he questioned Burns’ duties and took away her responsibility for scheduling international missions, reallocating that work to nine male supervisory FAMs.
Burns alleges Johnson made demeaning comments, used a sharp tone, turned his back on her, and kept a baseball bat in the office which she viewed as intimidating; she went on medical leave and then applied for early retirement, claiming constructive discharge.
Burns sued Jeh Johnson (Secretary of Homeland Security, official capacity) and David Johnson (official and individual capacities) asserting Title VII gender discrimination, retaliation, sexual harassment/hostile work environment, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a Massachusetts due-process claim under Article X.
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the court accepts Burns’ factual allegations as pleaded and evaluates which claims survive against which defendants.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Are Title VII claims maintainable against David Johnson (non-head)?	Burns sued both Johnsons on Title VII theories.	Title VII requires suit against the head of the department/agency; David Johnson is not the proper Title VII defendant.	Dismissed Title VII claims against David Johnson.
Gender discrimination (Count 1): adverse action/constructive discharge	Burns contends removal of duties and resulting constructive discharge were gender-motivated.	Defendants argued insufficiency of pleaded discriminatory motive or adverse action.	Claim survives as to Secretary (sufficient at pleading stage).
Retaliation (Count 2): protected activity requirement	Burns says she complained about Johnson’s conduct and was stripped of duties shortly after.	Complaints were general and did not assert sex-based discrimination; thus not protected under Title VII.	Dismissed in full for failure to plead protected activity.
Hostile work environment / sexual harassment (Counts 5 & 6)	Burns alleges pervasive intimidation (bat), demeaning comments, and differential treatment based on sex.	Most alleged acts were isolated/offhand and often directed at both sexes; quid pro quo not pleaded.	Quid pro quo claim dismissed; hostile-work-environment (Count 6) survives against the Secretary based principally on the bat-related allegations and coworker testimony suggesting sex-based differential treatment.
State torts for emotional distress (Counts 3 & 4)	Burns seeks relief for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from the same conduct.	Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for federal employment discrimination; tort claims are preempted.	Dismissed as preempted by Title VII.
Article X (Mass. Declaration of Rights) due-process claim (Count 7)	Burns alleges a property interest in employment and constructive discharge without process.	The Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) provides the exclusive remedy for federal personnel actions and preempts state-law and constitutional claims.	Dismissed as preempted by the CSRA.

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. Univ. of P.R., 714 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2013) (distinguishing discrete adverse actions from hostile-work-environment claims)
Ahern v. Shinseki, 629 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2010) (constructive discharge standard)
Marrero v. Goya of P.R., 304 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2002) (constructive discharge test)
Morales-Vallellanes v. Potter, 605 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2010) (retaliation/causation principles under Title VII)
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (definition of adverse action in retaliation context)
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (framework distinguishing discrete acts vs. hostile work environment)
Colón v. Tracey, 717 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2013) (hostile-work-environment standards)