Burkett, R. v. St. Francis Country House
133 A.3d 22
Pa. Super. Ct.2016Background
- Decedent (Nannie Burkett) was admitted to St. Francis Country House on June 14, 2010; her son Roy J. Burkett Jr. signed the Admission Agreement as the resident’s “Responsible Person,” which contained a mandatory arbitration clause for personal injury/medical malpractice claims.
- Decedent died November 24, 2010; Burkett filed suit in October 2012 alleging negligence, vicarious liability, wrongful death (42 Pa.C.S. § 8301), and survival claims (42 Pa.C.S. § 8302).
- St. Francis moved to compel arbitration; the trial court denied the motion, concluding the arbitration clause bound the resident (decedent) but not non-signatory wrongful-death beneficiaries or claims outside its scope.
- St. Francis appealed, arguing (1) all claims must be arbitrated under the FAA, (2) at minimum the survival claims must be severed and sent to arbitration under the FAA, and (3) Pisano was wrongly decided and should be overruled.
- The Superior Court reviewed whether a valid arbitration agreement existed (undisputed) and whether Burkett’s claims fell within its scope; it considered Pisano and Taylor controlling precedents.
- The court affirmed the trial court: wrongful-death claimants who did not personally waive jury rights are not bound by the decedent’s arbitration agreement; under Taylor, wrongful-death and survival actions must be consolidated for trial and thus cannot be severed to send the survival claim to arbitration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Burkett) | Defendant's Argument (St. Francis) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver of arbitration defense (procedural pleading) | St. Francis waived arbitration by not pleading it in New Matter | St. Francis filed motion to compel shortly after answer; no prejudice | No waiver — late motion did not affect substantial rights; arbitration defense not forfeited |
| Whether wrongful-death beneficiaries are bound by decedent’s arbitration clause | Burkett: wrongful-death beneficiaries are not bound; claim is independent and beneficiaries did not waive jury rights | St. Francis: signature by Responsible Person binds the signatory and beneficiaries; clause covers claims arising from residency | Held for Burkett — wrongful-death claimants are not bound by the decedent’s arbitration agreement (Pisano controlling) |
| Whether survival claims must be severed and sent to arbitration under the FAA | Burkett: survival claim remains in court and is consolidated with wrongful-death claim | St. Francis: survival action derives from decedent’s rights and must be arbitrated; if mixed claims, FAA requires arbitrable claims be sent to arbitration (severance/bifurcation) | Held for Burkett — under Taylor, Pa.R.C.P. 213(e) and § 8301 require consolidation of wrongful-death and survival claims; thus court did not abuse discretion in refusing to sever survival claim to arbitration |
| Request to overrule Pisano (validity of pre-dispute arbitration for wrongful-death claims) | Burkett: Pisano correctly recognizes wrongful-death claimants’ independent rights and jury-trial protections | St. Francis: Pisano improperly prevents enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements and should be overturned | Not reached on merits — St. Francis waived preservation of this argument; Superior Court bound by Pisano and could not overrule it |
Key Cases Cited
- Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 77 A.3d 651 (Pa. Super. 2013) (arbitration agreement signed by decedent does not bind non-signatory wrongful-death beneficiaries)
- Taylor v. Extendicare Health Facilities, Inc., 113 A.3d 317 (Pa. Super. 2015) (Pa.R.C.P. 213(e) and § 8301 require consolidation of wrongful-death and survival claims; controls on severance question)
- Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201 (U.S. 2012) (FAA preempts state laws that categorically prohibit arbitration of certain claims)
- Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (U.S. 1985) (FAA can require arbitration of arbitrable claims even if that results in piecemeal litigation)
- Frey v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 607 A.2d 796 (Pa. Super. 1992) (survival action derives from decedent’s causes of action and damages prior to death)