Burke v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc.
113 F. Supp. 3d 863
E.D. Va.2015Background
- In 2014 Gene and Virginia Burke bought a new 2014 Thor Palazzo RV; Freightliner Custom Chassis Corp. (FCCC) made the chassis and Thor Motor Coach (Thor) made the remainder.
- The RV experienced numerous mechanical and living-quarters defects; repairs by FCCC and Thor allegedly failed to fix them.
- The Burkes sued under the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act (Count I) and Virginia’s lemon law, the Motor Vehicle Warranty Enforcement Act (Count II).
- Thor moved to dismiss Count II, arguing Virginia’s lemon law applies only to the self-propelled motorized chassis of motor homes and Thor did not manufacture the chassis.
- The parties disputed statutory definitions (Va. Code § 59.1-207.11 and § 46.2-100); two prior federal cases reached opposite conclusions on whether the lemon law covers non-chassis portions of motor homes.
- The court denied certification to the Virginia Supreme Court, interpreted the statutes itself, and dismissed Count II against Thor because Thor did not manufacture the chassis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Virginia’s lemon law covers non-chassis portions of a motor home | Burke: the lemon law’s incorporation of § 46.2-100 makes the dwelling/sleeping structure part of a "motor vehicle," so final-stage manufacturers like Thor are liable | Thor: the lemon law explicitly limits coverage to the "self-propelled motorized chassis of motor homes," so non-chassis manufacturers are excluded | The court held the statute covers only the self-propelled motorized chassis of motor homes; Thor, not having manufactured the chassis, cannot be held liable under the lemon law. |
| Whether the question should be certified to the Supreme Court of Virginia | Burke: impliedly opposed certification (argued the law covers the whole motor home) | Thor: requested certification because Virginia appellate authority is lacking and federal district courts conflict | The court declined to certify, reasoning it could and should resolve the state-law question itself to avoid unnecessary delay. |
Key Cases Cited
- Parks v. Newmar Corp., 384 F. Supp. 2d 966 (W.D. Va. 2005) (held lemon law does not extend to non-chassis portions when chassis assembled separately)
- Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974) (federal courts have discretion to certify state-law questions)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard for Rule 12(b)(6): plausibility requirement)
- Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947) (definition and meaning of "primary")